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INTRODUCTION
This Article questions a persistent and pervasive view about the proper ob-
jective of corporate governance: that managers should favor long-term share-
holders over short-term shareholders and aim to increase long-term sharehold-
er value rather than the short-term stock price. This view is widely shared by
leading academics, executives, corporate lawyers, and judges. It is also at the
heart of recent reform proposals -in the United States, the United Kingdom,
and elsewhere -to give long-term shareholders more power over public com-
panies.2
The persistence of this view derives from a widely held and appealing intui-
tion: because managers serving short-term shareholders may destroy economic
value to boost the short-term stock price, managers serving long-term share-
holders will necessarily generate more economic value over time (a bigger
"pie"). The problem with this intuition is that it is wrong, at least for the typi-
cal U.S. firm that transacts in (buys and sells) a large volume of its own
shares.3 Yes, managers serving short-term shareholders might destroy econom-
ic value to boost the short-term stock price. But in a transacting firm, managers
serving long-term shareholders might also destroy economic value to boost the
long-term stock price. In fact, long-term shareholders may well benefit more
from value destruction than will short-term shareholders. Therefore, favoring
long-term shareholders in the typical firm could, paradoxically, reduce the size
of the pie created by the firm over time.
A firm's directors and CEO (collectively, its "managers") have at least some
incentive to serve shareholders' interests, even if they are not completely faith-
ful agents of the firm's shareholders. How managers respond to this incentive
will depend, in part, on shareholders' time horizons. If short-term investors
exert greater influence on managers than do long-term shareholders, then
managers can be expected to focus on increasing the short-term stock price ra-
ther than long-term shareholder value. If long-term shareholders are more
powerful than short-term shareholders, then managers can be expected to fo-
cus less on the short-term stock price and more on increasing long-term share-
holder returns.4
1. See infra Part I.B.
2. See infra Part I.C.
3. See infra Parts IV.A, V.A (describing the extent to which firms buy and sell their own
shares).
4. For example, directors can be expected to design executive compensation arrangements that
reflect the objectives of the firm's most powerful shareholders. If short-term shareholders
dominate, pay arrangements can be expected to reward executives for boosting the short-
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Much attention has been focused on the potential problems that can arise
when a firm's investor base consists largely of short-term shareholders.' In par-
ticular, managers seeking to serve short-term shareholders may engage in
"short-termism": taking steps that boost the short-term stock price but reduce
the economic value created by the firm over the long term. The cost of short-
termism is borne by other parties, including long-term shareholders (if any)
and future shareholders who purchase shares in the short term.6
Short-termism has long been considered a major problem for publicly trad-
ed U.S. firms. For decades, legal academics,7 business school professors,8 exec-
utives,9 and corporate lawyers' ° have decried the potentially perverse interests
of short-term shareholders. The recent financial crisis, which many blame on
the influence of short-term shareholders, has renewed and intensified criticism
of these investors. 1
While short-term shareholder interests are roundly criticized, the interests
of long-term shareholders are generally all but put on a pedestal. Legal aca-
demics 2 and business school professors 3 urge managers to ignore the short-
term stock price. If long-term shareholders dominate, pay arrangements can be expected to
reward executives for boosting long-term metrics.
S. See infra Part I.A.
6. See infra Part III.B.1.
7. See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empower-
ment, 158 U. PA. L. REv. 653, 696-703 (2010) (arguing that short-term shareholder influence
has pernicious effects).
S. See, e.g., Justin Fox & Jay W. Lorsch, The Big Idea: What Good Are Shareholders?, HARv. Bus.
REv., July-Aug. 2012, at 48 (criticizing the harmful influence of short-term shareholders in
U.S. firms); Michael E. Porter, Capital Disadvantage: America's Failing Capital Investment
System, HARv. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1992, at 65, 66-68 (similar).
9. See, e.g., Bus. & Soc'y Program, Overcoming Short-Termism: A Callfor a More Responsible Ap-
proach to Investment and Business Management, ASPEN INST. (Sept. 9, 2009) [hereinafter
ASPEN INSTITUTE], http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/docs/bsp/over
comeshort_stateo9o9.pdf [http://perma.cc/QT3H-8RHS] (report critical of short-term
shareholders signed by Berkshire Hathaway CEO Warren Buffett and other leading execu-
tives).
lo. See, e.g., Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, Election Contests in the Company's Proxy: An
Idea Whose Time Has Not Come, 59 Bus. LAw. 67, 78 (2003) (noting that short-term share-
holders tend to push companies to take steps that will result in a quick profit, which may
come at the expense of economic value creation).
ii. See, e.g., Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate Governance, 37 J.
CoRp. L. 265 (2012).
12. See John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Corporate Cooperation, Relationship Management,
and the Trialogical Imperative for Corporate Law, 78 MINN. L. REv. 1443, 1444, 1484 (1994)
(arguing that managers should focus their efforts on maximizing value for long-term share-
holders); cf. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Gov-
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term stock price and focus on maximizing value for long-term shareholders.'
Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman have gone so far as to say a decade
ago that "[t]here is no longer any serious competitor to the view that corporate
law should principally strive to increase long-term shareholder value."' s Man-
agers, in turn, appear to have accepted the norm of maximizing long-term
shareholder value. '
6
However, even managers who wish to serve long-term shareholders may
believe that short-term shareholder pressure prevents them from doing so.
Consequently, policymakers are considering various types of proposals to in-
crease the power of long-term shareholders in public companies relative to the
power of short-term shareholders.' 7 One set of proposals aims to give long-
term shareholders more voting rights in the firm.' 8 Another set of proposals
ernance, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 547, 573 (2003) (arguing that directors are "obliged to make deci-
sions based solely on the basis of long-term shareholder gain").
13. Porter, supra note 8, at 79 (calling for long-term shareholder value maximization to "be
identified as the explicit corporate goal").
14. Delaware judges also appear to believe that managers should serve long-term shareholders
rather than short-term shareholders. See Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware's
Takeover Law: The Uncertain Search for Hidden Value, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 521, 527 (2002)
(noting that one can infer from a Delaware Supreme Court decision that "boards must...
have a duty to maximize long-term shareholder value"); E. Norman Veasey, The Stockholder
Franchise Is Not a Myth: A Response to Professor Bebchuk, 93 VA. L. REv. 811, 815-16 (2007)
(distinguishing between the short-term interests of institutional investors and the interests
of the "underlying investors," who are also described as "'long-term' stockholders").
15. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J.
439, 439 (2001). The thrust of Hansmann and Kraakman's argument is that social welfare
would be maximized if corporate law served shareholder interests rather than those of other
stakeholders. But their use of the phrase "long-term" value suggests that they believe that
social welfare would be maximized if corporate law served long-term shareholders rather
than short-term shareholders.
16. See, e.g., Principles of Corporate Governance 2005, Bus. ROUNDTABLE 31 (Nov. 2005), http://
www.ibm.com/ibm/governmentalprograms/pdf/BRTCorpGovPrinciples200s.pdf [http://
perma.cc/Z62-PG6S] (describing "the paramount duty to optimize long-term shareholder
value").
17. See infra Part I.C. In response to the perceived power of short-term shareholders, many
commentators are also calling for steps to better insulate managers from shareholders gen-
erally. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth that Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value,
113 COLUM. L. REv. 1637, 1646-48 (2013) (identifying various advocates of increased board
insulation).
18. COLIN MAYER, FIRM COMMITMENT: WHY THE CORPORATION Is FAILING US AND How To
RESTORE TRUST IN IT 246-47 (2013) (suggesting that "voting control ... be concentrated on
long-term investors"); Fox & Lorsch, supra note 8, at 56-57 (suggesting that voting power
should increase with length of share ownership); Andrew Haldane, Exec. Dir., Fin. Stabil-
ity, & Richard Davies, Economist, Fin. Inst. Div., Bank of Eng., Speech at the 29 th Soci&t6
Universitaire Europ~ene de Recherches Financihres Colloqium: The Short Long 13 (May ii,
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seeks to increase the number of long-term shareholders by rewarding them
with additional dividends or other cash-flow rights.'9 A third set of proposals
seeks to increase the number of long-term shareholders by revamping the in-
come tax system to make long-term stock ownership relatively more attrac-
tive.'
Yet the norm of favoring long-term shareholders over short-term share-
holders, and efforts to boost the number and power of long-term shareholders
in public companies, are driven by a flawed intuition: that managers serving
long-term shareholders will necessarily generate more value over time than
managers serving short-term stockholders. I show that in a typical U.S. firm-
that is, a firm that transacts heavily in its own shares - managers serving long-
term shareholders will not necessarily generate more value over time than
managers serving short-term shareholders, and may well generate less. All of
the recent efforts to favor long-term shareholders may thus, perversely, reduce
the value generated by firms over the long term.'
For most of this Article, I focus on a firm in which the only residual claim-
ants on the value created by the firm are the firm's current and future share-
2011), http://www.bis.org/review/rlos51e.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZKE4-UFQN] (calling for
enhanced shareholder voting rights for long-term investors).
19. For example, economists Patrick Bolton and Frederic Samama have suggested that long-
term shareholders receive "L-shares" -shares entitling them to additional stock in the firm.
See Patrick Bolton & Frederic Samama, Loyalty-Shares: Rewarding Long-Term Investors, 25 J.
APPLIED CoRP. FIN. 86 (2013) (suggesting that shareholders receive call options that are ex-
ercisable only if they hold their shares for a certain period).
zo. For example, the Aspen Institute has proposed a graduated long-term capital gains tax rate,
with the lowest rate available only to shareholders that own their stock for a considerable
period of time. See ASPEN INSTITUTE, supra note 9, at 2-3.
21. This Article is part of a larger project of mine that seeks to explore the corporate governance
implications of the increasing tendency of U.S. firms to buy and sell large amounts of their
own shares. One earlier article focused on the implications of firms' transacting in their own
equity for executive compensation arrangements. See Jesse M. Fried, Share Repurchases, Eq-
uity Issuances, and the Optimal Design of Executive Pay, 89 TEx. L. REV. 1113, 1136-40 (2011)
[hereinafter Fried, Repurchases] (describing the distortions associated with tying executive
pay to the long-term stock price in a transacting firm, and proposing a new approach to ex-
ecutive compensation that eliminates those distortions). Another earlier article focused on
the need to bring firm insider trading regulation up to date to prevent insiders from using
firms to engage in indirect insider trading. See Jesse M. Fried, Insider Trading via the Corpo-
ration, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 8oi (2014) [hereinafter Fried, Insider Trading] (explaining how the
relatively lax disclosure rules applied to firms trading in their own shares lead insiders with
large equity positions to use the firm to engage in indirect insider trading, and proposing
that disclosure rules be harmonized by applying the same trade disclosure rules to both in-
siders and firms). This Article builds on the analytical framework developed in these two
works to argue that the increasing tendency of firms to buy and sell their own shares re-
quires a fundamental reconsideration of the long and widely held view that regulators and
managers should favor long-term shareholders over short-term shareholders.
156o
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holders: the investors who own or will own shares between now and "the long
term" (by which I mean the relevant end period, however that period is deter-
mined). In other words, the firm's current and future shareholders capture all
of the value generated by the firm over time. I will call this a "shareholder-
only" firm.
I begin by considering a "non-transacting" shareholder-only firm: one that
does not repurchase its own shares or issue additional shares before the long
term arrives. I show that, in this type of firm, the conventional view is correct:
managers serving long-term shareholders will generate more economic value
over time than managers serving short-term shareholders. In particular, long-
term shareholders will want managers to maximize the economic pie. Short-
term shareholders, on the other hand, may benefit when managers engage in
what I call "costly price-boosting manipulation" - actions that boost the short-
term stock price at the expense of the pie generated over the long term. There-
fore, in such a firm, it is better for the economy, and for investors in the aggre-
gate, if managers seek to maximize long-term shareholder value instead of do-
ing all they can to boost the short-term stock price, regardless of the
consequences for the size of the pie.
Most U.S. firms, however, are "transacting." They buy and sell large vol-
umes of their own shares each year: approximately $i trillion worth market-
wide.' The magnitude is staggering, not only in absolute terms, but also rela-
tive to firms' market capitalization. Over any given five-year period, U.S. firms
buy and sell stock equivalent in value to approximately 30% of their aggregate
market capitalization. 3 Thus, for example, a company with a market capitaliza-
tion of $1o billion today can be expected to buy and sell $3 billion of its own
shares over the next five years.
I show that, in a transacting firm, managers can boost long-term share-
holder payoffs by taking value-destroying steps in the short term. I first con-
sider a "repurchasing firm"-a firm that buys back its own shares before the
long term arrives. In a repurchasing firm, long-term shareholder payoffs de-
pend, in part, on the price and quantity of previously repurchased shares.
Therefore, long-term shareholders benefit when managers conduct "bargain"
repurchases - buybacks at a price below the stock's actual value.
Bargain repurchases need not destroy economic value. In principle, they
may merely redistribute a slice of the pie from short-term shareholders to long-
term shareholders without shrinking the pie itself. If bargain repurchases are
merely value-shifting and not value-destroying, then managers serving long-
term shareholders will seek to enrich them either by creating economic value
22. See infra Parts V.A, VI.A.
23. See infra Parts IVA, VIA.
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(as in the non-transacting firm) or by shifting value, but never by destroying
economic value. Thus, as in a non-transacting firm, it would be better for man-
agers to serve long-term shareholders rather than short-term shareholders.
However, I show that managers seeking to boost long-term shareholder
payoffs in a repurchasing firm may take two kinds of steps that do destroy val-
ue and diminish the economic pie. First, managers may engage in "costly con-
traction": the undertaking of economically excessive repurchases that divert
funds from valuable projects inside the firm to buy back sharply discounted
shares. For example, suppose that buying $ioo of a firm's temporarily cheap
stock would yield a 40% return to long-term shareholders, a return that repre-
sents a transfer of value from other shareholders. And suppose that investing
that same $ioo in a firm project would yield a 3o% return ($30) for all the
firm's shareholders. Finally, suppose that if the $1oo were distributed to selling
shareholders in a repurchase, those selling shareholders would earn a io% re-
turn ($1o) on the $1oo through various investments outside the firm. Thus, if
the $1oo is distributed in a repurchase, the total amount of value created for
shareholders in the aggregate will decline by $20, from $30 to $io. But manag-
ers serving long-term shareholders will distribute that $ioo through a repur-
chase rather than invest in the higher-value internal project yielding 3o%, be-
cause the repurchase diverts enough value from other shareholders to provide
long-term shareholders with a 40% return. There is evidence suggesting that
firms engaging in share repurchases cut back on valuable activities inside the
firm.' 4
Second, managers serving long-term shareholders may engage in costly
price-depressing manipulation either to make a bargain repurchase possible or,
if the stock is already underpriced, to increase the extent of the bargain. Once a
firm decides to repurchase shares, long-term shareholders can benefit if man-
agers engage in value-destroying manipulation to lower the price further be-
fore the repurchase occurs. As with costly contraction, such manipulation in-
creases the amount of value transferred to long-term shareholders while
shrinking the overall pie. Indeed, firms conducting repurchases engage in such
manipulation with the intention of boosting the long-term stock price."
I then turn to consider the case in which a transacting firm issues addition-
al equity before the long term. Here, long-term shareholders' payoffs depend
on the price that future shareholders pay for the stock and the amount of
shares sold to future shareholders. Managers can serve the interests of long-
term shareholders by conducting inflated-price issuances, and this benefit in-
creases with the amount of shares sold.
24. See infra Part V.A.2.
25. See infra Part V.B.
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Inflated-price issuances, like bargain repurchases, need not be value-
destroying. In theory, they may merely redistribute value from future share-
holders to long-term shareholders. But managers conducting inflated-price eq-
uity issuances purely for the benefit of long-term shareholders can be expected
to engage in two types of actions that destroy value.
First, when the stock price is high, managers seeking to boost the long-
term stock price may cause the firm to issue shares to acquire assets even if the
economic value of those assets declines when they are absorbed into the firm.
America Online's (AOL) acquisition of Time Warner in 2000, for $162 billion
of stock, is a well-known example of long-term shareholders' benefitting ex
post from an issuance that destroyed economic value. 6 The acquisition de-
stroyed so much economic value that AOL and Time Warner were forced to
part ways nine years later. Nevertheless, from an ex post perspective, AOL's
long-term shareholders undeniably benefitted from the transaction; it enabled
them to buy Time Warner's valuable assets at an extremely cheap price. In
2009, their combined stakes in AOL and Time Warner were worth approxi-
mately 400% more than the AOL stake they would have held absent AOL's ac-
quisition of Time Warner.2 7
Second, managers conducting inflated-price issuances can further benefit
long-term shareholders by engaging in costly price-boosting manipulation
(such as earnings manipulation). Such manipulation can transfer even more
value to long-term shareholders. As a result, when a firm sells its own shares at
an inflated price, the very same pie-reducing strategies that benefit short-term
shareholders can serve the interests of long-term shareholders. Indeed, AOL
engaged in such value-destroying manipulation when it issued stock to Time
Warner shareholders, benefitting AOL's current long-term shareholders to the
detriment of its future shareholders. 8 AOL is not alone. There is evidence that
firms issuing equity to acquire the assets of other companies systematically en-
gage in value-destroying manipulation to boost the apparent value of the con-
sideration being given to target shareholders. 9
Given the volume of repurchases and equity issuances undertaken by the
typical U.S. firm, the amount of value that managers can transfer to long-term
shareholders by exploiting mispricing in firms' securities and engaging in these
types of value-destroying manipulations is likely to be substantial. Indeed, a
recent study by Richard Sloan and Haifeng You confirms that there already has
been a large-scale transfer of value to long-term shareholders in publicly traded
26. The AOL-Time Warner transaction is discussed in more detail infra Part VII.A.2.
27. See infra Part VII.A.2.
28. See infra Part VII.B.2.
29. See infra Part VII.B.2.
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U.S. firms via equity transactions. The study finds that over the last forty
years, an aggregate of over $2.3 trillion has been transferred to long-term in-
vestors through bargain repurchases and inflated-price equity issuances .3 So
managers have been annually transferring an average of $5o billion in value to
long-term shareholders. Across the market, aggregate value transfer exceeds
20% of aggregate net income, suggesting that almost 20% of the wealth created
by publicly traded companies for their long-term shareholders is generated via
transfers from other shareholders; for smaller firms, the percentage is much
higher, around 50%.31 To the extent these transfers involve actions such as
stock price manipulation or costly contraction, the cost to other shareholders is
likely to exceed $50 billion per year. These amounts are likely to increase if, as
is proposed, long-term shareholders are given even more power in widely held
firms.
My purpose in this Article is not to argue that managers focused on serving
long-term shareholders necessarily generate less economic value than managers
focused on serving short-term shareholders. Rather, my objective is to show
that neither managers serving long-term shareholder interests nor managers
serving short-term shareholder interests will seek to maximize the economic
value created by the firm over time. Managers faithfully serving either type of
shareholder at the expense of the other can be expected to take steps that shrink
the pie. Consequently, the case for favoring long-term shareholders is substan-
tially weaker than it might appear.
The fundamental problem with focusing on either short-term or long-term
shareholder interests is that neither type of shareholder interest reflects the
value flowing to both the firm's current and future shareholders. The short-
term stock price does not reflect the value flowing to long-term shareholders
and future shareholders. Long-term shareholder value does not fully incorpo-
rate the value flowing to short-term shareholders and future shareholders. In
sum, both short-term shareholder and long-term shareholder payoffs can be
enhanced by managers inefficiently transferring value from other shareholders
in the firm, to the detriment of the overall economic pie.
So should long-term shareholders be favored? Ultimately, the desirability
of favoring long-term shareholders depends not only on the analysis of the fi-
nancial interests of short-term and long-term shareholders that I have offered,
but also on two additional considerations. These two additional considerations
are the interests of non-shareholder "stakeholders" and managerial agency
30. Richard G. Sloan & Haifeng You, Wealth Transfers via Equity Transactions i (Aug. 4,
2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssm.com/abstract=218986 [http://perma.cc/WsJA
-NJPW].
31. Id. at 19.
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costs. Although a complete analysis of these two considerations is beyond the
scope of this project, I address them briefly at the end of the Article.
I first turn to stakeholders. Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout have long point-
ed out - correctly, in my view - that non-shareholder stakeholders also have
residual claims on the corporation.' One might believe that these stakeholders
are likely to be better off if managers run the firm for the benefit of long-term
shareholders rather than short-term shareholders. However, I explain that as a
matter of economic theory, the effect of managers' time horizons (that is,
whether managers serve short-term or long-term shareholders) on stakeholder
welfare is actually indeterminate. 3 Indeed, if markets are as inefficient as many
believe, managers faithfully serving long-term shareholders may sometimes
seek to squeeze more value from other stakeholders than managers serving
short-term shareholders. For example, the long-term shareholders controlling
Wal-Mart did not build their fortunes by overpaying employees. 4 Thus, the
potential existence of non-shareholder residual claimants may or may not
strengthen the case for favoring long-term shareholders.
I next turn to managerial agency costs, which have long been considered
one of the most significant problems in the corporate governance of widely
held firms.3" The desirability of giving long-term shareholders relatively more
power in the corporation (relative to short-term shareholders) will depend on
whether long-term shareholders are better or worse at controlling managerial
agency costs. But here, as with stakeholders, it is unclear which type of share-
holder is preferable. On the one hand, long-term shareholders' horizons give
them a greater interest in controlling managerial agency costs. On the other
hand, to the extent that short-term shareholders are willing to accumulate larg-
er positions than long-term shareholders, they may have greater incentives and
ability to discipline managers than do long-term shareholders. If the latter ef-
fect dominates, favoring long-term shareholders by impeding short-term
shareholders may lead to higher managerial agency costs.
All in all, it is unclear whether long-term shareholders' alignment with
stakeholder interests and their ability to control managerial agency costs are
better or worse than those of short-term shareholders. Therefore, adding
stakeholder interests and the control of managerial agency costs to the mix is
32. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85
VA. L. REv. 247, 314 n.178 (1999) (explaining that non-shareholder constituencies are also
residual claimants on the corporate pie).
33. See infra Part IX.A.
34. See infra Part IX.A.
35. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FiN. ECON. 305, 354-55 (1976).
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unlikely to strengthen or weaken the case for favoring long-term shareholders.
That case remains much weaker than it might otherwise appear, and it certain-
ly is far from compelling.
Before proceeding, a word about controlling shareholders is in order. The
purpose of this Article is to reexamine the desirability of favoring long-term
shareholders in a widely held firm where law, regulation, and private ordering
can be used to shift power away from short-term shareholders to long-term
shareholders. But my analysis also has implications for the large number of
firms in which long-term shareholders already dominate: firms with control-
ling shareholders. 36 While it is well understood that a controlling shareholder
may seek to engage in inefficient self-dealing transactions in order to directly
transfer value from the corporation to the controlling shareholder,37 my analy-
sis suggests another problem: controlling shareholders, qua long-term share-
holders, may also have their firms engage in a variety of other inefficient trans-
actions that transfer value from other shareholders to themselves - namely,
costly contraction, costly expansion, and share-price manipulation around re-
purchases and equity issuances."' As far as I can tell, this problem has been
largely overlooked.3 9 Therefore, the economic costs associated with controlling
shareholders may be even higher than is widely believed.
36. Most corporations in Europe, Asia, and Latin America have controlling shareholders. See
Borja Larrain & Francisco Urzdia I., Controlling Shareholders and Market Timing in Share Issu-
ance, 1O9 J. FIN. ECON. 661, 661 (2013). Even in the United States, average insider owner-
ship in publicly traded U.S. firms is over twenty percent. See Clifford G. Holderness, The
Myth of Diffuse Ownership in the United States, 22 REv. FIN. STUD. 1377, 1382 (2009). This fig-
ure suggests that controlling shareholders are more common in the United States than is
widely believed.
37. See, e.g., Simon Johnson et al., Tunneling, 9o AM. ECON. REv. 22, 22 (2000).
38. For evidence that these types of value diversion occur in controlled firms, see Jae-Seung
Baek et al., Business Groups and Tunneling: Evidence from Private Securities Offerings by Korean
Chaebols, 61 J. FIN. 2415, 2445-46 (20o6), which finds evidence consistent with the use of eq-
uity issuances by controlling shareholders of Korean firms to transfer value to themselves
from public shareholders; and Larrain & Urztia I., supra note 36, at 679, which examines
equity issuances by controlling shareholders of Chilean firms between 199o and 20o9 and
finds evidence consistent with controlling shareholders' timing issuances to transfer value
from future shareholders.
39. For example, William Bratton and Michael Wachter recently argued that a controlling
shareholder, unlike short-term shareholders, "has no incentive to consider speculative mis-
pricing when determining investment policy." Bratton & Wachter, supra note 7, at 714. My
analysis suggests that this claim is incorrect, at least when the firm is buying and selling its
own shares. A controlling shareholder may well respond to speculative overvaluation by sell-
ing shares and investing inefficiently. Furthermore, if value-reducing investment will suffi-
ciently increase the extent of speculative overpricing, managers may well engage in such in-
vestment to increase the value that can be transferred from future shareholders.
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This Article is organized as follows. Part I describes the conventional wis-
dom about short-term and long-term shareholders. Part II lays out my positive
and normative assumptions for the analysis. Part III shows that in a non-
transacting firm (a firm that does not repurchase or issue any shares), the intu-
ition that managers serving long-term shareholders will generate more value
than managers serving short-term shareholders is correct. Part IV shows that
in a repurchasing firm, long-term shareholder interests do not align with the
maximization of economic value. Part V identifies the various ways in which
managers in a repurchasing firm may destroy value to benefit long-term share-
holders. Part VI shows that in a transacting firm that issues shares, long-term
shareholder interests do not align with economic value maximization. Part VII
details the various ways that managers in an issuing firm may destroy value to
benefit long-term shareholders. Part VIII describes the circumstances in which
managers serving long-term shareholders are more likely to destroy value than
managers serving short-term shareholders. Part IX addresses the implications
of stakeholders and managerial agency costs for the desirability of favoring
long-term shareholders. A conclusion follows.
I. SHORT-TERM VERSUS LONG-TERM SHAREHOLDERS: THE
CONVENTIONAL VIEW
This Part describes the conventional view about short-term shareholders
(Part I.A) and long-term shareholders (Part I.B). It then surveys recent pro-
posals designed to increase the proportion and power of long-term sharehold-
ers in public companies (Part I.C).
A. The (Undesirable) Interests of Short- Term Shareholders
Even the staunchest proponent of shareholder empowerment must be pre-
pared to accept the following proposition: short-term shareholder interests do
not completely coincide with the goal of maximizing the economic value creat-
ed by the firm over time. In particular, managers seeking to serve short-term
shareholders may engage in "short-termism": taking steps that boost the short-
term stock but reduce the size of the pie.4' The economic cost of any short-
termism is borne (at least in the first instance) by other parties with residual
claims on the value created by the firm. These residual claimants include both
1567
40. For an explanation of how short-termism can arise even in a fully rational market, see infra
Part III.B.
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long-term shareholders and those future shareholders who buy shares at an in-
flated price in the short term.4'
The question, then, is not whether short-termism can exist, but rather:
how bad is it? Some argue that short-termism has been and continues to be a
large problem. For several decades, Martin Lipton and his colleagues at
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz have attacked short-term shareholders for hav-
ing objectives "not in accordance with the long-term interests of other share-
holders and other constituencies."' During the 198os and early 199os, busi-
ness thought leaders routinely blamed short-term shareholders for the poor
performance of U.S. firms relative to those in Germany and Japan.43 The recent
financial crisis has renewed and intensified criticism of short-term shareholders
from legal academics,' business school professors," and leading business fig-
ures. 46
B. The (Desirable) Interests of Long-Term Shareholders
While the interests of short-term shareholders are denigrated, the interests
of long-term shareholders are exalted. Legal academics of a variety of persua-
sions have long believed that managers should ignore the short-term stock
price and focus on maximizing long-term shareholder value.47 Even Stephen
Bainbridge, who has long argued against shareholder empowerment and for a
41. Other residual claimants on the value generated by the corporation include non-shareholder
stakeholders such as employees and communities. See infra Part IX.
42. See Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101, 104 (1979);
Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note io, at 78 (noting the power of short-term shareholders,
who may push companies to take steps at the expense of economic value creation).
43. See, e.g., Porter, supra note 8 (criticizing the harmful influence of short-term shareholders in
U.S. firms, among other problems).
44. See, e.g., Bratton & Wachter, supra note 7, at 658-60 (arguing that managers' focus on the
short-term stock price played a role in creating the financial crisis and that short-term
shareholders should not be further empowered); Dallas, supra note ii (blaming "short-term
traders" for the financial crisis and calling for the empowerment of long-term shareholders
as one of a number of possible regulatory responses).
45. Fox & Lorsch, supra note 8 (arguing that short-term shareholder influence has pernicious
effects).
46. See, e.g., ASPEN INSTIrUTE, supra note 9 (report critical of short-term shareholders signed by
Berkshire Hathaway CEO Warren Buffett and other leading executives).
47. See, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Reforming Executive Compensation: Focusing and
Committing to the Long-Term, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 359, 359 (2009) (stating that compensation
arrangements should be "focused on creating and sustaining long-term shareholder value");
Matheson & Olson, supra note 12, at 1444, 1484 (1994) (arguing that managers should focus
their efforts on maximizing value for long-term shareholders).
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"director primacy" view of corporate governance, has written that directors
should be "obliged to make decisions based solely on the basis of long-term
shareholder gain."4s The wide acceptance of the long-term shareholder value
norm is illustrated by the earlier-quoted statement by Henry Hansmann and
Reinier Kraakman, that "[t]here is no longer any serious competitor to the
view that corporate law should principally strive to increase long-term share-
holder value."49
America's leading business academics share this view. For example, Har-
vard Business School's Michael Porter has written that "long-term shareholder
value should be identified as the explicit corporate goal. The burden of proof
should shift so that managers must explain any decision that is not consistent
with long-term shareholder value.""0 Kellogg School of Management's Alfred
Rappaport has argued that "management's primary responsibility is to maxim-
ize long-term shareholder value," which means "that management's primary
commitment is to continuing shareholders rather than to day traders, momentum
investors, and other short-term-oriented market players. ""
Significantly, the Delaware Supreme Court has emphasized the importance
of serving long-term shareholders over short-term shareholders.5 2 Of course,
directors owe fiduciary duties to all (current) shareholders.53 But some share-
holders, apparently, are more equal than others. For example, in Gantler v. Ste-
phens, the Delaware Supreme Court described "enhancing the corporation's
long term share value" as a "distinctively corporate concern[]."' And a former
Delaware Supreme Court Justice, Norman Veasey, wrote a law review article
that distinguished between short-term and long-term shareholders, describing
only the latter as the firm's "underlying investors. " "
48. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97
Nw. U. L. REv. 547, 573 (2003).
49. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 15, at 439; cf Matheson & Olson, supra note 12, at 1484
(arguing that "[t]he focus on longterm shareholders maximizes... economic efficiency in
the long run").
50. Porter, supra note 8, at 79.
s. Alfred Rappaport, The Economics of Short-Term Performance Obsession, FIN. ANALYSTS J.,
May-June 2oo5, at 65, 69.
sa. Cf. Black & Kraakman, supra note 14, at 527 n.20 (2002) (concluding that the Delaware Su-
preme Court "signaled ... long-term shareholder primacy" (citing Paramount Commc'ns,
Inc. v. Time, 571 A.2d 1140, 1153 (Del. 199o))),
53. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 129 (Del. Ch. 2011) ("Directors of a
corporation still owe fiduciary duties to all stockholders-this undoubtedly includes short-
term as well as long-term holders.").
s4. 965 A.2d 695, 706 (Del. 2009).
55. Veasey, supra note 14, at 815.
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With legal academics, business school professors, and judges all humming
the same tune, it is not surprising that managers have fully internalized the
norm of maximizing long-term shareholder value. For example, the Business
Roundtable, a collection of CEOs from major U.S. corporations that seeks to
influence public policy, referred to "the paramount duty to optimize long-term
shareholder value.", 6 In 2006, the Business Roundtable's Institute for Corpo-
rate Ethics and the Chartered Financial Analyst Institute's Centre for Financial
Market Integrity produced a report recommending changes in corporate gov-
ernance to align managers' actions with long-term shareholder interests. 7 Fur-
thermore, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce Center for Capital Markets Com-
petitiveness reports that it advocates policies for the "positive promotion of
long-term shareholder value."s8 Firms routinely report in their proxy state-
ments that their primary purpose is to build "long-term shareholder value."59
C. Policy Proposals To Favor Long-Term Shareholders
Because of the perceived undesirability of short-term shareholder interests
and the perceived desirability of long-term shareholder interests, lawmakers,
regulators, and firms are considering and (in some cases) implementing a vari-
ety of measures to increase the power of long-term shareholders in public
companies relative to the power of short-term shareholders.
As discussed in more detail below, these measures fall into three categories:
(1) enhanced voting and control rights for long-term shareholders; (2) en-
hanced cash flow rights for long-term shareholders, to encourage long-term
shareholding; and (3) changes in the tax system designed to increase the rela-
tive number of long-term shareholders.
S6. Bus. ROUNDTABLE, Principles of Corporate Governance 2012, at 30 (2012), http://
businessroundtable.org/sites/default/files/BRTPrinciples of CorporateGovernance_-201
2_FormattedFinal.pdf [http://perma.cc/DsXX-sXW8].
5-. Dean Krehmeyer, Matthew Orsagh & Kurt N. Schacht, Breaking the Short-Term Cycle: Dis-
cussion and Recommendations on How Corporate Leaders, Asset Managers, Investors, and Analysts
Can Refocus on Long-Term Value, CFA CENTRE FOR FIN. MKT. INTEGRITY & Bus.
ROuNDTABLE INST. FOR CORP. ETHICS (20o6), http://www.cfapubs.org/doi/pdf/lo
.2469/ccb.v20o6.nI.4194 [http://perma.cc/Q7KH-MB8Z].
58. Best Practices and Core Principles for the Development, Dispensation, and Receipt of Proxy Advice,
U.S. CHAMBER COM. CENTER FOR CAPITAL MKTS. COMPETITIVENESS 2 (Mar. 2013),
http ://www.centerforcapitalmarkets.com/wp-content/uploads/2o1o/o4/Best-Practices-and
-Core-Principles-for-Proxy-Advisors.pdf [http://perma.cc/K4QB-SEE2].
59. See, e.g., Definitive Proxy Statement, AMAZON.COM, INC. 6 (2013), http://www.sec.gov
/Archives/edgar/data/io1874/ooo119312513151 558/d44544oddeft4 a.htm [http://perma.cc/
3H64-XBRQJ ("The Board is responsible for the control and direction of the Company....
[A]nd its primary purpose is to build long-term shareholder value.").
1570
124:1554 2015
THE UNEASY CASE FOR FAVORING LONG-TERM SHAREHOLDERS
1. Enhanced Voting and Control Rights
A number of prominent business commentators in the United States have
suggested that long-term shareholders should receive more voting rights in the
firm in order to increase the relative power of each long-term shareholder. For
example, Justin Fox and Jay Lorsch have argued for "giving a favored role to
long-term shareholders" by increasing voting power with the length of share
ownership or simply "restrict[ing] voting in corporate elections of any kind to
those who have owned their shares for at least a year. ,6o Similar proposals have
been floated by academics and regulators in the UK
6' and the EU.62
The Aspen Institute's Business and Society Program, a collection of leading
executives and corporate governance specialists, has also recommended consid-
eration of such arrangements. 6 The director of this program, Judith Samuel-
son, has written that corporations should be permitted to overweight the votes
of long-term equity-holders so that "only true 'owners' of stock, and not tran-
sient 'renters,' . . . have a substantive voice in a company." 6, Similarly, an
American Bar Association corporate governance task force has expressed sup-
port for exploring the use of such arrangements.6 s
6o. Fox & Lorsch, supra note 8, at 56-57; see also Martin Lipton, Jay W. Lorsch & Theodore N.
Mirvis, A Crisis Is a Terrible Thing To Waste: The Proposed "Shareholder Bill of Rights Act of
2009" Is a Serious Mistake, WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ 4 (May 12, 2oo9), http://
www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/WLRKMemos/WLRK/WLRK.166 57 .og.pdf [http://
perma.cc/V9FG-ENDQj (proposing enhanced voting rights for long-term shareholders).
61. See, e.g., MAYER, supra note 18, at 246-47 (suggesting that long-term shareholders be given
enhanced voting rights); Haldane & Davies, supra note 18 (calling for enhanced shareholder
rights for long-term investors).
6z. In early 2013, EU Internal Market Commissioner Michel Barnier released a consultation
paper exploring ways to reward long-term shareholder commitment, including the possibil-
ity of granting additional voting rights to long-term shareholders or linking dividend pay-
ments to the holding periods of shares. See Alex Barker, Brussels Aims To Reward Investor
Loyalty, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2013, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/o/167e6ofc-6574-lne2-8bo3
-oo144feab49a.html [http://perma.cc/QE94-4R6B].
63. See ASPEN INSTITUTE, supra note 9, at 3 (recommending tax reforms, removal of limitations
on capital loss deductibility for very long-term holdings, and a minimum holding period or
time-based vesting).
64. See Rebecca Dart & Judith Samuelson, Beyond the Crisis: Policies To Foster Long-Termism in
Financial Markets, in SECOND SUMMIT ON THE FUTURE OF THE CORPORATION: PAPER SERIES
ON RESTORING THE PRIMACY OF THE REAL ECONOMY 1, 6 (Allen White ed., 2009),
http://www.summit202O.org/downloads/2ndSummit-PaperSeries.pdf [http://perma.cc
/FHE 3 -TSHV].
6s. See Report of the Task Force of the ABA Section ofBusiness Law Corporate Governance Committee
on Delineation of Governance Roles and Responsibilities, 65 Bus. LAW. 107, 151 (2009) (urging
consideration of a policy rewarding long-term holding through tax incentives and enhanced
voting rights to encourage shareholder interest in long-term investment).
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Federal regulators have also shown sympathy for the view that long-term
shareholders should receive special privileges. When the Securities and Ex-
change Commission was considering its proxy access rule, the Business
Roundtable and others sought to restrict access to long-term shareholders.66
The SEC's final version of the rule in 2010 (which was later invalidated by the
D.C. Circuit) responded to these concerns by limiting proxy access to share-
holders that had held their shares continuously for at least three years.6 7
Delaware judges, both in their decisions and in other fora, have indicated
an acceptance of discrimination in voting rights against short-term sharehold-
ers and in favor of long-term shareholders. For example, in Williams v. Geier,
the Delaware Supreme Court upheld the validity of a charter provision grant-
ing superior voting rights to shareholders who held their shares for a continu-
ous three-year period.68 One of the firm's justifications for this arrangement,
which the court did not dispute, was to "[m]aintain [the] ability to maximize
long-term value for shareholders."6 9
More informal and indirect approaches to increasing the influence of long-
term shareholders have also been proposed. For example, the U.K.'s 2012 Kay
Commission report recommended that firms consult "major long-term inves-
tors" regarding board appointments.7' Delaware Supreme Court Chief Justice
Leo Strine has similarly urged firms to consult long-term investors when mak-
ing board appointments.'
2. "Loyalty" Shares and Dividends
Boosting the number and proportion of long-term shareholders would also
increase their power. One set of proposals seeks to convert short-term share-
holders into long-term shareholders by rewarding long-term shareholders with
additional dividends or other cash-flow rights. For example, economists Pat-
66. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,697-99 (Sept.
16, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. ptS. 200, 232, 240, 249) (discussing the holding period
requirement for proxy access and comments on the requirement).
67. 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668 (Sept. 16, 2010) (amending 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249), invalidat-
ed by Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
68. 671A.2d 1368, 1384-85 (Del. 1996).
69. Id. at 1372.
70. John Kay, The Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long-Term Decision Making 63
(July 2012), http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/business-law/docs/k/12-917-kay-review
-of-equity-markets-final-report.pdf [http://perma.cc/SH3R-439M].
pi. Leo E. Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We Face: Can Corporations
Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates Also Act and Think Long
Term?, 66 Bus. LAw. 1, 7 (2010).
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rick Bolton and Fr~d6ric Samama have suggested that long-term shareholders
receive "L-shares"- shares entitling them to additional stock in the firm.' Un-
der the Bolton and Samama proposal, buy-and-hold investors would get a free
call option, or warrant, if they held their shares for a pre-specified period of
time (three years, for example).3
Several European firms have already modified their corporate arrange-
ments to give long-term shareholders more cash-flow rights vis- -vis short-
term shareholders. For example, the French firms L'Oreal, Electricit6 de
France, Air Liquide, and Credit Agricole have all offered or will offer extra div-
idends to long-term shareholders.74 Air Liquide is also giving long-term share-
holders extra shares.7' Similar arrangements have been proposed in the Nether-
lands and the U.S.76
3. Tilting the Tax System To Favor Long-Term Shareholders
A third set of proposals seeks to increase the number of long-term share-
holders by revamping the income tax system to make long-term stock owner-
ship relatively more attractive. For example, the Aspen Institute has proposed a
graduated long-term capital gains tax rate, with the lowest rate available to
shareholders who own their stock for the longest period of time.77 The Aspen
Institute has also proposed increasing the deductibility of long-term capital
losses. 78 Similarly, Vanguard's John Bogle has suggested eliminating the tax
deductibility of short-term capital losses and increasing the tax rate on ordinary
income generated by stock trading.79
72. Bolton & Samama, supra note 19, at 88 (suggesting that shareholders receive call options
that are exercisable only if they hold their shares for a certain period).
73. Id. at 89.
74. Id. at 95.
75. Id.
76. See a Different Class: Would Giving Long-Term Shareholders More Clout Improve Corporate
Governance?, ECONOMIST, Feb. 18, 201o, http://www.economist.com/node/1 554431o
[http://perma.cc/YUL9-QTMU] (reporting a similar proposal in the Netherlands); Al Gore
& David Blood, A Manifestofor Sustainable Capitalism: How Businesses Can Embrace Environ-
mental, Social and Governance Metrics, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 2011, http://online
.wsj.com/news/articles/SBooo1424o5297o2o343o4o4577o92682864215896 [http://perma.cc
/5QHG-YQNC] (suggesting that firms provide loyalty shares to long-term investors).
77. See ASPEN INSTITUTE, supra note 9, at 3.
78. See id.
79. See John C. Bogle, The Clash of the Cultures, 37 J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 14,25 (2011) (calling for
the elimination of tax deductibility for short-term capital losses and an increased tax on in-
come from stock trading).
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The Aspen Institute is trying to rally support for a tax on transactions in
the stock market,s Such a tax was first proposed by John Maynard Keynes in
the 193os 81 and later endorsed by economists Joseph Stiglitz and Larry Sum-
mers in the late 198os.82 One of the main purposes of such a securities tax is to
make short-term stock ownership less attractive and thereby increase the pro-
portion of long-term shareholders in public firms .5
4. Summing Up
The conventional view is simple. Short-term shareholders have undesirable
interests: their payoffs do not align with economic value creation over time.
Accordingly, these shareholders pressure managers to act in ways that destroy
economic value. The solution to this problem is that managers should run the
firm for the benefit of long-term shareholders and should seek to maximize
long-term shareholder value. Indeed, it might well be desirable to give long-
term shareholders more power in the corporation so that managers focus less
on maximizing the short-term stock price and more on maximizing long-term
shareholder value.
As we will see, long-term shareholder interests are better (that is, better
aligned with economic value creation) than short-term shareholder interests in
a particular firm: one that does not transact in its own shares. However, it is far
from clear that long-term shareholder interests are better than short-term
shareholder interests in the typical U.S. firm, which heavily buys and sells its
own shares. In such a firm, long-term shareholders may have worse interests.
Therefore, shifting power to long-term shareholders might actually reduce the
value generated by the firm over time.
So. See ASPEN INSTITUTE, supra note 9, at 3 (proposing a tax on securities transactions to dis-
courage short-term trading).
81. See JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MON-
EY 159-6o (Harcourt Brace 1964) (1936).
82. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Using Tax Policy To Curb Speculative Short-Term Trading, 3 J. FIN.
SERVS. RES. 101, 108-O9 (1989) (arguing that a transaction fee could lead to an increase in
the relative number of long-term investors, causing managers to shift their focus to the long
run); Lawrence H. Summers & Victoria P. Summers, When Financial Markets Work Too
Well: A Cautious Case for a Securities Transaction Tax, 3 J. FIN. SERVS. RES. 261 (1989) (simi-
lar).
83. See Stiglitz, supra note 82, at lo9.
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II. ANALYTICAL BUILDING BLOCKS
This Part provides two critical building blocks for my analysis. Part ILA
outlines what I take to be the policy objective of corporate governance regula-
tion: maximizing "economic value" -the (net) economic output generated by
the firm, from today through the long term. Part II.B describes my assump-
tions about short-term and long-term shareholders' objectives.
A. Policy Goal: Maximizing Economic Value
I take it as given that the regulation of public companies should be de-
signed to maximize the economic value created by a typical firm over time. 4 In
particular, I assume that it is desirable to maximize the net economic output of
the firm from today until "the long term"-the relevant end point, however
that end point is determined.8 The net economic output of the firm is simply
the value of assets distributed or retained by the firm less the value of assets
contributed to the firm. I call this maximand "economic value," or, more fig-
uratively, "the pie."
To focus the analysis, I will for now consider a "shareholder-only" firm.
That is, I assume that the only residual claimants on the economic pie are the
firm's current shareholders (who own shares now) and future shareholders
(who will buy its shares in the future, but before the long term arrives).86 As a
result, economic value is equivalent to the net amount of value flowing to cur-
rent and future shareholders through the long term -cash they receive from
the firm less cash (or other assets) they transfer to the firm.8 7
84. See, e.g., REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., TH ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE
AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 28 & n.79 (2d ed. 2009) (urging the use of Kaldor-Hicks effi-
ciency as the criterion for evaluating corporate law and corporate governance arrange-
ments).
85. Because of the need to discount for the time value of money and risk, future cash flows are
less valuable in present dollar terms than are current cash flows. So the long term might be
the future point in time when the present value of the cash flow becomes immaterial. Alter-
natively, the long term might be the future point in time when the firm ceases to be publicly
traded.
86. I also assume that the firm's equity consists entirely of one class of common shares.
87. I ignore prior asset flows to and from the firm as "sunk" and focus only on asset flows be-
tween the firm and shareholders in the period that starts today and ends in the long term.
The assumption that current and future (common) shareholders are the firm's only residual
claimants is, of course, a simplification. Other stakeholders, such as creditors, preferred
shareholders, and employees, may also be affected by the firm's actions. And from an eco-
nomic perspective, it is desirable to maximize the total value flowing to all of these stake-
holders. Thus, assessing whether it would be desirable to shift power from short-term
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In effect, I treat current and future shareholders as if they collectively were
a "sole owner" of the corporation. Such a hypothetical sole owner would wish
to maximize the net amount flowing to it over time -the amount withdrawn
from the corporation (via dividends and repurchases) less the amount invested
in the firm (through the purchase of equity from the firm).
To be sure, the premise that it is desirable to maximize the net value flow-
ing to all shareholders of the firm (both current and future), rather than current
shareholder value, might be questioned. In the U.S., directors generally owe a
fiduciary duty to the firm and its current shareholders; future shareholders are
not owed a fiduciary duty until after they have acquired stock in the firm. s8
One might therefore believe that a firm should be run to maximize the value
flowing solely to current shareholders.
From an economic perspective, however, a dollar flowing to a current
shareholder is no more or less valuable than a dollar flowing to a future share-
holder (ignoring, of course, the time value of money). Consequently, there is
no economic reason for policymakers or analysts, in assessing policy proposals
(including proposals designed to shift power to long-term shareholders), to
weigh these dollars differently.8 Accordingly, I assign the same weight to eve-
ry dollar flowing to or from a firm's shareholders, whether the dollar flows to a
current or future shareholder before the long term arrives.90
shareholders to long-term shareholders depends on how such a shift affects other residual
claimants. I take up this issue infra Part IX.
88. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Temporal Perspectives: Resolving the Conflict Between Current and
Future Investors, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1044, 1049 (2005) ("Directors and management, at least
in the United States, have a fiduciary duty only to investors holding an existing property
right or equitable interest to support such a duty- i.e., current investors."); cf. Corp. Prop.
Assocs. 14 Inc. v. CHR Holding Corp., Civ. A. No. 3231-VCS, 2008 WL 963048, at *4 (Del.
Ch. Apr. 1O, 2008) ("[T]he Delaware Supreme Court has consistently held that directors do
not owe fiduciary duties to future stockholders." (quoting Feldman v. Cutaia, Civ. A. No.
1656-N, 2006 WL 920420, at *6 n.37 (Del. Ch. Apr. 5, 2006))).
89. See Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity, 34 FiN. MGMT. S, 16 (2005) (argu-
ing that managers and the board should treat all shareholders -including future sharehold-
ers- equally to maximize the firm's long-term economic value).
90. Perhaps recognizing the lack of an economic rationale for distinguishing between current
and future shareholders, authorities in other common law systems, such as the U.K., have
made explicit that directors owe a fiduciary duty to both current and future shareholders.
See, e.g., Simon Goulding & Lilian Miles, Regulating the Approach of Companies Towards Em-
ployees: The New Statutory Duties and Reporting Obligations of Directors Within the United
Kingdom, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE LEGAL RESPONsIBuLrTY 88, 89 (Stephen
Tully ed., 2005) (interpreting U.K. corporate law to, in most cases, require directors to ad-
vance the interests of "present and future" shareholders).
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B. Shareholders' Objectives
My focus in this Article is on the objectives of short-term and long-term
shareholders -that is, the outcomes they want the firm's managers to produce.
I assume that short-term shareholders will sell their entire equity interest in the
short term, and that long-term shareholders will sell their entire equity in the
long term, and not engage in any equity transactions in the short term. In other
words, I assume "ideal types."9' I will also assume that shareholders seek the
highest possible financial return from their investment in the firm, given their
holding period. Therefore, they will want managers to maximize the stock
price in the period when they will be selling their shares: short-term share-
holders will seek a higher short-term stock price, while long-term shareholders
will seek a higher long-term stock price. 9
In most of my analysis, I abstract from short-term and long-term share-
holders' abilities to achieve their objectives. That is, I put aside the problem of
managerial agency costs: namely, that managers, who directly control the firm,
will pursue their own interests rather than those of either short-term share-
holders or long-term shareholders. In Part IX, I will briefly consider the possi-
bility that short-term and long-term shareholders may differ in their abilities to
g. The assumption that short-term and long-term shareholders are ideal types is made mostly
for ease of exposition. The analysis would not be affected if long-term shareholders engaged
in a relatively small amount of stock transactions in the short term. However, the analysis
would change if long-term shareholders engaged in meaningful amounts of stock transac-
tions in the short term. Consider, for example, an investor that sells 50% of its interest in the
short term and 50% of its interest in the long term. That investor would be as interested in
(ideal-type) short-term shareholder payoffs as in (ideal-type) long-term shareholder pay-
offs, and thus (unlike either ideal-type shareholder) not favor steps that favor one type of
shareholder at the expense of the other. Or consider a "constant-share" long-term share-
holder that sells shares whenever the firm repurchases shares and buys shares whenever the
firm issues shares so as to keep the long-term shareholder's percentage equity ownership
constant. As I have explained elsewhere, the fact that a constant-share long-term sharehold-
er's payoff would fully internalize the potentially adverse effects of repurchases and equity
issuances on other shareholders would perfectly align the shareholder's interest with pie
maximization. See Pried, Repurchases, supra note 21, at 1136-4o (putting forward a constant-
share approach to executive compensation and demonstrating that giving an executive long-
term equity and requiring the executive to maintain the same percentage of the firm's equity
as the firm buys and sells its own shares would tie the executive's payoff to the pie created
by the firm over time). My analysis in this Article thus implicitly assumes that long-term
shareholders' short-term trading, if any, is sufficiently modest that their interests can rea-
sonably be captured by those of an ideal-type long-term shareholder.
92. In a firm that issues dividends, both short-term and long-term shareholders care not just
about stock price appreciation during the relevant period but about their total return, which
includes dividends. I assume, for simplicity, that the firms used as examples in this Article
do not issue dividends. This assumption does not affect any of the analysis or conclusions.
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reduce managerial agency costs. Until then, however, my focus is solely on the
objectives of short-term shareholders and long-term shareholders.
III. LONG-TERM SHAREHOLDER RETURNS IN A NON-TRANSACTING
FIRM
The conventional view is that managers serving long-term shareholders
will generate more value over time than managers serving short-term share-
holders. This Part shows that the conventional view is correct in a shareholder-
only firm that does not transact in its own shares.
Part III.A introduces a simple analytical framework for examining the rela-
tionship between shareholders' returns and economic value in a non-
transacting shareholder-only firm. Part III.B describes long-term and short-
term shareholders' returns in this setting. In such a firm, long-term sharehold-
er returns are purely a function of the size of the economic pie. In contrast,
short-term shareholder returns are not.
A. Framework ofAnalysis
Consider a hypothetical non-transacting shareholder-only firm, ABC Cor-
poration, in a three-period setting: (1) today; (2) the short term; and (3) the
long term. The long term is the relevant end period. The short term is a future
point in time, occurring before the long term.
ABC Corporation's situation in the three periods is as follows:
" Today: ABC has two shares outstanding. One share is held by
short-term shareholders (denoted "ST"). One share is held by
long-term shareholders (denoted "LT").
" Short term: Short-term shareholders sell their one share to future
shareholders (denoted F).1 3 The sale price is $P per share. The
price $P may or may not reflect the share's actual (full-
information) value.
93. The short-term shareholder might have already held shares in ABC for many years and thus
colloquially be considered a "long-term shareholder." In my framework, this investor is con-
sidered a short-term shareholder because, as of today, it will sell its shares in the short term
rather than in the long term.
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Long term: ABC's assets are sold for $V in cash, which reflects their
actual value. 94 A total of $V is distributed to long-term sharehold-
ers and future shareholders. Because each type of shareholder holds
one share, long-term shareholders receive $V/2 and future share-
holders receive $V/2.
The sequence of events is illustrated in Figure 1 below.
Figure i.
ABC AS A NON-TRANSACTING FIRM
Short term Long term




ST 0 ---- Sells for $P
F Buys for $P Receives $V/2
Between today and the long term, the only cash flowing between ABC and
its shareholders is the payment of $V made by ABC to long-term shareholders
and future shareholders when ABC's assets are sold in the long term. Accord-
ingly, economic value -the net amount of value flowing from ABC to ABC's
shareholders over time-is $V.9" Economic value (the pie), and the net
94. Throughout, I assume that ABC's assets are correctly valued in the long term. In other
words, ABC's long-term stock price reflects the actual value of ABC's shares in the long
term. This assumption, which is made solely for ease of exposition, is not critical to the Arti-
cle's analysis or conclusions.
95. Again, I ignore asset flows between ABC and its shareholders before today as "sunk." In the
examples in this Article, I ignore the time value of money (or, alternatively, assume it is ze-
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amounts flowing to short-term shareholders and long-term shareholders, are
summarized in Table i below.
Table i.
SHAREHOLDER PAYOFFS AND THE PIE IN A NON-TRANSACTING FIRM
Short-Term Long-Term Future Shareholders The Pie
Shareholders Shareholders
$P $V/2 $(V/2 - P) $V
B. Long-Term Shareholders' "Better" Interests
In a non-transacting shareholder-only firm, short-term shareholder inter-
ests may not align with pie maximization, but long-term shareholder interests
always will.
1. Short-Term Shareholders
Short-term shareholders will want managers to maximize the short-term
stock price ($P) at which they will sell shares to future shareholders. In a ra-
tional market, $P would reflect the best possible estimate (based on public in-
formation) of $V. And in a rational market with full information, $P would
equal $V. Accordingly, in a full-information rational market, managers serving
short-term shareholders would strive to maximize the pie.
But in the real world, future shareholders do not have full information
about the value of a firm's stock.96 Future shareholders must rely on infor-
mation provided by managers. Managers, in turn, can engage in "price-
boosting manipulation" -providing information to make the firm appear more
valuable than it really is, thereby boosting the price that future shareholders
will pay for the stock. Indeed, short-term shareholders will want managers to
engage in price-boosting manipulation because it will increase their returns.
to). This assumption, made purely for convenience, does not affect the analysis or conclu-
sions.
96. In the real world, markets not only may lack full information but also may not be rational.
Indeed, many economists hold the view that real-world markets are not rational but "noisy."
See, e.g., ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL Fi-
NANCE (2000). To keep things simple, I will generally assume that markets are rational. But
this assumption is not necessary for any of my analysis or conclusions. Both short-term and
long-term shareholders' interests are likely to diverge from pie maximization whether mar-
kets are rational or noisy.
158o
124:1554 201 5
THE UNEASY CASE FOR FAVORING LONG-TERM SHAREHOLDERS
If price-boosting manipulation were always economically costless -that is,
if it would not reduce the size of the pie -then short-term shareholders' inter-
ests would be consistent with pie maximization. Short-term shareholders
would want managers to boost the short-term stock price through manipula-
tion, and managers serving short-term shareholders would do so. But no value
would be destroyed in the process. Instead, value would merely be transferred
from one type of shareholder (future shareholders) to another (short-term
shareholders) without any reduction in the size of the pie as a whole.97
However, short-term shareholders can also benefit from, and therefore will
want managers to engage in, costly price-boosting manipulation - manipulation
that boosts the short-term stock price but destroys economic value. 9 8 Because
short-term shareholders care only about the short-term stock price, any corpo-
rate action that boosts the short-term stock price serves their interest, even if it
destroys value.
Using the analytical framework introduced in Part III.A, suppose that man-
agers could engage in an action X that boosts the short-term stock price $P by
$1 and reduces $V by $0.25. X would destroy $o.25 of economic value. But
short-term shareholders would want managers to engage in X because X
boosts $P, the price at which short-term shareholders unload their shares.
Managers already engage in a variety of practices that constitute costly
price-boosting manipulation. One practice is earnings manipulation: reporting
earnings different from the "correct" amount of earnings given the firm's actual
business activity and cash flows.99 Another practice is real earnings manage-
ment: the postponing of desirable transactions or premature acceleration of
transactions to boost short-term accounting results and the short-term stock
97. If markets are rational, then future shareholders will fully discount for the possibility of
price-boosting manipulation. Ex ante, price-boosting manipulation will not transfer value
from future shareholders to short-term shareholders, on average.
98. One might wonder why I use the awkward term "costly price-boosting manipulation" rather
than more compact and well-known terms such as "short-termism" or "managerial myo-
pia." I resort to this ungainly expression because, as I explain in Part VII.B, actions that in-
crease the short-term stock price but reduce the economic pie can not only serve short-term
shareholders, but can also increase the long-term stock price on behalf of the long-term share-
holders of the firm when the firm is issuing stock. Indeed, managers serving long-term
shareholders of issuing firms engage in the very same types of value-reducing activities as
managers serving short-term shareholders.
99. See Ilia D. Dichev et al., Earnings Quality: Evidence from the Field, 56 J. ACcT. &ECON. (SUPP.
1) 1, 3 (2013) ("The CFOs in our sample estimate that, in any given period, roughly 20% of
firms manage earnings and the typical misrepresentation for such firms is about lo% of re-
ported [earnings per share]."). Such manipulation reduces economic value to the extent that
the firm devotes resources to adjusting its earnings.
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price at the expense of long-term economic value.'00 Each of these strategies
shrinks the economic pie but makes the short-term stock price higher than it
would otherwise be. 0
While managers certainly engage in costly price-boosting manipulation,
they may do so to enrich themselves rather than to enrich short-term share-
holders. 10 2 Indeed, only a few published studies have found evidence of a link
between short-term shareholders and costly price-boosting manipulation.0 3
Therefore, many legal academics are skeptical that pressure from short-term
shareholders causes managers to engage in value-destroying activities.' 4 But
oo. For evidence that managers engage in real earnings management, see, for example, Sugata
Roychowdhury, Earnings Management Through Real Activities Manipulation, 42 J. ACCT. &
ECON. 335, 335-36 (2006). Roychowdhury finds evidence consistent with managers' over-
producing goods and manipulating discretionary expenditures in a manner that boosts re-
ported earnings but does not appear to increase economic value. See also John R. Graham et
al., Value Destruction and Financial Reporting Decisions, 62 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 27, 31 fig.4 (Nov.-
Dec. 20o6), which reports the results of a survey of over 400 senior financial executives in
which eighty percent reported that, to meet an earnings target, they were willing to reduce
discretionary spending on R&D, advertising, and maintenance, as well as delay starting pro-
jects, even if the actions reduced long-term cash flow.
1o. Importantly, costly price-boosting manipulation does not necessarily cause the short-term
stock price to become "inflated" - that is, exceed its true (full-information) value. After cost-
ly price-boosting manipulation occurs, the short-term stock price may still be lower than the
stock's true value. However, the short-term stock price will be higher than it would be if,
everything else equal, managers had not engaged in costly price-boosting manipulation.
And the economic pie will be smaller. See, e.g., Jeremy C. Stein, Efficient Capital Markets, In-
efficient Firms: A Model of Myopic Corporate Behavior, 104 QJ. ECON. 655, 656-61 (1989)
(considering a model in which managers forgo beneficial investments to inflate current
earnings and boost the current stock price, and future shareholders rationally discount cur-
rent earnings accordingly).
102. See LuciAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROM-
ISE OF ExEcuTIVE COMPENSATION 183-85 (2004).
103. See Natasha Burns et al., Institutional Ownership and Monitoring: Evidence from Financial Mis-
reporting, 16 J. CORP. FIN. 443, 444 (2010) (examining firms that restated earnings between
1997 and 2002 and finding that ownership by "transient institutions" -those that trade ac-
tively and rapidly in search of profits -is associated with an increase in the likelihood and
severity of an accounting restatement); Brian J. Bushee, The Influence of Institutional Investors
on Myopic R&D Investment Behavior, 73 ACCT. REv. 305, 307 (1998) (finding that firms with
more short-term shareholders are more likely to cut R&D expenses to meet short-term tar-
gets).
104. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth that Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value, 113
COLUM. L. REv. 1637, 1643-44 (2013) (arguing that there is little evidence that short-term
shareholder influence undermines long-term value creation); George W. Dent, Jr., The Es-
sential Unity of Shareholders and the Myth of Investor Short-Termism, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 97,
149-50 (2010) (noting that there is very little evidence of short-termism); Marcel Kahan &
Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L.
REv. 1021, 1o85 (2007) ("[T]he empirical evidence on the extent and magnitude of myopia
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whatever one's view on this empirical question, there is no escaping the conclu-
sion that short-term shareholder interests are not perfectly aligned with pie
maximization.' s
2. Long-Term Shareholders
Now consider long-term shareholders. Long-term shareholder interests are
straightforward. As Table 1 makes clear, long-term shareholders' payoff ($V/2)
rises and falls with economic value ($V).1 °6 In a non-transacting shareholder-
only firm, long-term shareholder interests are aligned with maximizing the
economic pie.
Accordingly, managers loyally serving long-term shareholders will seek to
generate more value than managers loyally serving short-term shareholders.
The conventional view and intuition about long-term shareholder interests is
correct- at least for a non-transacting, shareholder-only firm.
Most firms, however, aggressively transact in their own shares. Indeed,
publicly traded firms in the U.S. buy and sell, in aggregate, approximately $i
trillion of their own shares each year. 1 7 As we will see in the next four Parts,
when firms buy and sell their own shares, long-term shareholder returns be-
come decoupled from pie maximization and can be boosted by steps that actu-
ally destroy value. In such firms, neither short-term shareholder interests nor
is sketchy at best."); Mark J. Roe, Corporate Short-Termism -In the Boardroom and in the
Courtroom, 68 Bus. LAw. 977, 979 (2o13) (arguing that there is not enough evidence of cor-
porate short-termism to justify changes in corporate law).
1o5. If markets are rational, then short-term shareholders cannot systematically benefit from
costly price-boosting manipulation. But managers seeking to boost the short-term stock
price still engage in costly price-boosting manipulation at the "moment of truth" -the point
when they must decide whether to exploit an opportunity to do so. See, e.g., Stein, supra
note ioi, at 659-61. If markets are noisy rather than rational, the problem is much worse:
short-term shareholders can benefit both ex post and ex ante from costly price-boosting
manipulation. See Patrick Bolton et al., Executive Compensation and Short-Termist Behaviour
in Speculative Markets, 73 REv. ECON. STUD. 577 (2006) (presenting a model in which man-
agers serving short-term shareholders in a speculative market will engage in costly price-
boosting manipulation).
1o6. Recall that I am assuming that the long-term stock price reflects the economic value of
ABC's assets (here, $V). To the extent that the long-term stock price could be manipulated
by ABC's managers, long-term shareholder interests could become decoupled from pie max-
imization. For example, ABC's managers, seeking to serve long-term shareholders, might
take steps that increase ABC's apparent value by $2 ($1 per share) but reduce $Vby $0.50.
107. See infra Parts V.A, VIA.
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long-term shareholder interests align with pie maximization, and it becomes an
open question as to which shareholders' interests are better aligned with pie
maximization.
IV. LONG-TERM SHAREHOLDER RETURNS IN A REPURCHASING
FIRM
In this Part, I examine the interests of long-term shareholders in a repur-
chasing firm. Part IV.A describes the widespread use of repurchases by U.S.
firms. Part IV.B modifies the analytical framework presented in Part III to ex-
plain how stock buybacks change the relationship between long-term share-
holders' interests and economic value. Part IV.C shows that long-term share-
holders benefit when managers buy back stock at a cheap price; it also provides
evidence that managers currently engage in such "bargain repurchases. "lio
A. The Widespread Use of Repurchases
Publicly traded U.S. companies increasingly distribute cash through repur-
chases rather than through dividends' 9 Over 90% of U.S. public firms that
distribute cash to stockholders do so through share repurchases."11 In 2007,
S&P 500 firms distributed almost $600 billion through repurchases,"' and to-
tal repurchases market-wide reportedly reached $1 trillion."' While repurchase
volumes declined during the financial crisis, they have since returned to pre-
1o8. My goal in this Part and the next Part is not to systematically compare long-term and short-
term shareholder interests in a repurchasing firm. Rather, my objective is to show that re-
purchases in a shareholder-only firm decouple long-term shareholder interests from eco-
nomic value maximization. Therefore, I focus here on long-term shareholder interests in a
repurchasing firm. However, in passing I will mention whether the various actions taken to
serve long-term shareholder interests in a repurchasing firm are consistent or inconsistent
with short-term shareholder interests. In Part VIII, I describe the factors that are likely to af-
fect whether long-term or short-term shareholder interests are better aligned with pie max-
imization in a shareholder-only firm.
iog. See generally Douglas J. Skinner, The Evolving Relation Between Earnings, Dividends, and Stock
Repurchases, 87 J. FIN. ECON. 582 (2008) (comparing the percentages of firms that pay divi-
dends, firms that repurchase shares, and firms that do both).
110. See id. at 583 (detailing "the declining propensity to pay dividends").
111. See Standard & Poor's, S&P 500 Buybacks Set Record of $589 Billion in 2007, PRNEWSWIRE
(Apr. 7, 20o8), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/sp-5oo-buybacks-set-record-of
-589-billion-in-2007-57123197.html [http ://perma.cc/533Q(FZ5J].
im. See Paul A. Griffin & Ning Zhu, Accounting Rules? Stock Buybacks and Stock Options: Addi-
tional Evidence, 6 J. CONTEMP. ACCT. &ECON. 1 (2010).
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crisis levels: S&P 500 firms repurchased $475 billion of shares in 2013 and were
expected to repurchase nearly $6oo billion of shares in 2014.113
The volume of these share repurchases is substantial relative to firms' mar-
ket capitalizations. Goldman Sachs reports that over the past decade, including
the financial-crisis years, S&P 500 firms completed buybacks totaling 3% of
their market capitalization per year on average." 4 In other words, over a five-
year period, firms can be expected to distribute through share repurchases ap-
proximately 15% of their market capitalization. While many firms distribute
more, and many less, the typical firm is likely to repurchase a substantial
amount of its own stock.
The overwhelming majority of share repurchases take the form of "open
market repurchases" (OMRs) ."5 In an OMR, the firm repurchases its shares in
the open market through a broker. The transactions are anonymous: share-
holders are unaware that the firm is buying shares as the repurchases are occur-
ring. Investors learn about the transactions only after the end of the quarter,
typically one to four months after the transactions occur, when the firm reports
the prior quarter's monthly share repurchases." 6
To be sure, investors are aware that an OMR might be occurring. A firm
cannot conduct an OMR unless its board has previously announced that it has
authorized an OMR. 17 However, such an authorization is not binding on the
firm. Firms do not commit-and are not obligated-to buy back any stock. ,
8
In fact, one study found that almost 30% of firms announcing repurchases do
not buy back a single share within the fiscal year in which the repurchase an-
nouncement occurs, and about 15% do not buy back any shares within four fis-
113. See Sam Ro, The Rate of Share Buybacks Has Doubled in the Last Decade, Bus. INSIDER (Apr.
5, 2014, 12:40 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/sp-5oo-stock-buyback-history-2o1 4 -4
[http ://perma.cc/gKWK-6TAX] (reporting Goldman Sachs research on share buybacks).
114. Id.
"S. See Monica L. Banyi et al., Errors in Estimating Share Repurchases, 14 J. CoRp. FIN. 460, 460
(2008). Most other repurchases take the form of a "repurchase tender offer" (RTO), in
which the firm offers to buy back its own stock directly from shareholders, usually at a pre-
mium over the market price. RTOs can also be used for bargain repurchases. See Jesse M.
Fried, Insider Signaling and Insider Trading with Repurchase Tender Offers, 67 U. CHI. L. REv.
421,421 (2000).
116. For a description of the regulatory framework applicable to OMRs, see Fried, Insider Trad-
ing, supra note 21, at 812-15.
117. See id. at 813.
118. See David L. Ikenberry & Theo Vermaclen, The Option To Repurchase Stock, 25 FIN. MGMT.
9, 12 (1996) (explaining that, by indicating that actual repurchases will depend on "market
conditions," managers give themselves the option to repurchase stock if it turns out to be
cheap without revealing managers' actual intentions).
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
cal years of the announcement year. 19 Therefore, investors will not know with
certainty that the firm is repurchasing shares until months after the company
starts buying back shares.12
OMRs can generate some benefits for shareholders, such as providing a
more tax-efficient payout mechanism than dividends. 21 But, as we will see be-
low, OMRs also have a dark side. Managers may use OMRs to transfer value
from short-term shareholders to long-term shareholders in ways that shrink
the pie.
B. Analytical Framework: Decoupling Effect of Share Repurchases
To see how share repurchases decouple long-term shareholder interests
from economic value, we will modify the analytical framework introduced in
Part III to consider the scenario in which ABC Corporation repurchases its own
equity in the short term for $P. For now, I assume that the repurchase does not
increase or decrease the size of the pie.
The three periods are as follows:
" Today: ABC has two shares outstanding. One share is held by
short-term shareholders (denoted "ST"). One share is held by
long-term shareholders (denoted "LT").
" Short term: Short-term shareholders sell their one share to ABC.
The sale price is $P per share. The price $P may or may not reflect
the share's actual (full-information) value.
* Long term: ABC's assets are sold for $(V-P) in cash, which reflects
their actual value. The amount $(V-P) is distributed to long-term
shareholders, who in the long term hold lOO% of ABC's equity.
i19. See Utpal Bhattacharya & Stacey Jacobsen, The Share Repurchase Announcement Puzzle:
Theory and Evidence 3-4 (Nov. 2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract
=250049 [http://perma.cc/BSUN-ZKZN] (analyzing firms announcing share repurchase
programs in the period 1985 to 2012).
i2o. See Fried, Insider Trading, supra note 21, at 814-15.
121. Explanations of the potential benefits of repurchases are explored and analyzed in Jesse M.
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Because short-term shareholders sell their equity for $P per share to ABC
rather than to future shareholders, there are no future shareholders in this sce-
nario. The sequence of events is illustrated in Figure 2 below.
Figure 2.
ABC AS A REPURCHASING FIRM
Short term Long term
Today ST sells to ABC sold for
ABC $(V-P)
Shareholder
LT 0 *1 Receives $
ST " Sells for $P
Although ABC's value in the long term is different from what it was in the
non-transacting-firm scenario ($(V-P) instead of $V), the pie-the amount of
value flowing to shareholders over time -is the same: $V. The amount $ (V-P)
flows to long-term shareholders in the long term and the amount $P flows to
short-term shareholders in the short term.'
The pie and payoffs to shareholders are summarized in Table 2 below.
Table 2.
SHAREHOLDER PAYOFFS AND THE PIE IN A REPURCHASING FIRM
Short-Term Long-Term Future Shareholders The Pie
Shareholders Shareholders
$P $(V-P) N/A $V
Unlike in the non-transacting-firm scenario, in a repurchasing firm there is
now a disconnect between long-term shareholder returns and economic value.
122. Again, this example ignores the time value of money.
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As $P falls, long-term shareholders' payoff increases even though the pie re-
mains unchanged.
C. Bargain Repurchases
The analysis in Part IV.B suggests that managers can conduct "bargain re-
purchases" - OMRs at a cheap price -to transfer value from short-term share-
holders to long-term shareholders. And there is considerable evidence that they
do just that.
i. Economic Logic
As I have shown elsewhere, a share repurchase has the same distributional
consequences as a transaction in which the shareholders whose shares are re-
purchased directly sell their stock to the remaining shareholders at the repur-
chase price. 2 ' As a result, a repurchase at a low price (that is, a price lower than
the no-transaction intrinsic value of the stock) transfers value from selling
shareholders to non-selling shareholders."
We can see this in terms of our ABC example. In non-transacting ABC
(where there is no repurchase), the long-term shareholder will receive $V/2 for
its equity. In the event of a repurchase, it will receive $(V-P). The repurchase
payout will exceed the no-repurchase payout if and only if $P < $V/2. Thus,
when the short-term stock price is lower than the no-transaction intrinsic value
of the firm's shares, long-term shareholders will be better off if the repurchase
occurs than if it does not.'2
Warren Buffett, in explaining why Berkshire Hathaway seeks to buy its
own stock at a low price, puts it much more colorfully:
123. See Fried, supra note 121, at 1344-46.
124. When a firm buys stock at a price below its actual value, the precise distributional effects
depend on whether the redeeming shareholders (here, the short-term shareholders) would
have otherwise sold their shares to future shareholders for the same price. If so, the redeem-
ing shareholder cannot be said to "lose" any value as a result of the bargain repurchase. In-
stead, the bargain repurchase deprives would-be future shareholders of a gain. For ease of
exposition, however, I will generally assume (unless otherwise specified) that it is only the
redeeming shareholders that lose money as a result of the bargain repurchase.
125. I am continuing to assume that ABC's long-term stock price reflects the value of the stock in
the long term. But again, this assumption is not critical to my analysis or conclusions. Ra-
ther, all that is required is that ABC's managers expect that buying shares in the short term
at a low price (or selling shares in the short term at a high price) will boost the long-term
stock price.
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[T]here is no surer way [of making money for continuing sharehold-
ers] than by buying an asset-our own stock-that we know to be
worth at least x for less than that-for .9x, .8x or even lower. (As one of
our directors says, it's like shooting fish in a barrel, after the barrel has
been drained and the fish have quit flopping.) ... And the more and
the cheaper we buy, the greater the gain for continuing shareholders.12
6
2. Evidence offBargain Repurchases
Warren Buffett is not the only CEO who has figured out that bargain re-
purchases can generate long-term shareholder value. Evidence that managers
engage in bargain repurchases has been steadily accumulating. This evidence
includes (a) executives' own statements and behavior and (b) post-repurchase
stock returns, which are discussed in turn below.
a. What Executives Say and Do
When one wishes to understand why executives engage in a particular kind
of transaction (such as share repurchases), it is often helpful to ask them. This
is exactly what several economists did; they used a confidential survey to ask
executives about their firms' payout policies. According to Alon Brav and his
colleagues, "The most popular response for all repurchase questions on the en-
tire survey is that firms repurchase when their stock is a good value, relative to
its true value: 86.4% of all firms agree or strongly agree with this supposi-
tion."27 Importantly, these economists reported, "executives tell us that they
accelerate (or initiate) share repurchases when their company's stock price is
low. ,18
But there was probably no need to use a confidential survey to elicit this in-
formation. Executives should be willing to say the same things publicly. After
all, firms frequently and openly describe repurchase programs as designed to
buy shares at favorable prices for long-term shareholders. For example, in a
2013 press release, UnitedHealth Group announced that it increased its share
126. Letter from Warren Buffet, Chairman of the Bd., to Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway
Inc. (Feb. 25, 2012), http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/1etters/2oitr.pdf [http://perma
.cc/N8C2-DY 7 G].
127. Alon Bray et al., Payout Policy in the 21st Century, 77 J. FIN. ECON. 483, 514 (2005).
u8. Id.
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repurchase program to buy stock at low prices for the benefit of long-term
shareholders."
UnitedHealth Group's willingness to acknowledge openly that it uses in-
side information to stealthily acquire shares at a low price from short-term
shareholders to transfer value to long-term shareholders would be shocking in
a world in which managers believed that they owed the same duty to all share-
holders. But managers have been repeatedly told -by leading legal academics,
business school professors, and (perhaps most importantly) Delaware judges -
that they should maximize long-term shareholder value, even at the expense of
short-term shareholders. There is simply no reason for managers to be circum-
spect.
Managers do, in fact, use inside information to time repurchases. One re-
cent study found that firms systematically buy stock at low prices in each quar-
ter, often transferring large amounts of value to long-term shareholders. 3 ' In
one firm, 7.76% of the total market capitalization was shifted from selling
shareholders to long-term shareholders in this manner."' Unsurprisingly, this
study also found that managers' tendency to exploit non-public information in
timing repurchases increases with insider equity ownership -that is, the extent
to which their interests are aligned with those of long-term shareholders.'32
Other recent studies have reported similar results. '33
129. UnitedHealth Group Board Increases Shareholder Dividend 32%; Renews Share Repurchase
Program, UNrrEDHEALTH GRP. (June 5, 2013), http://www.unitedhealthgroup.com/News
room/Articles/Feed/UnitedHealth%2oGroup/2o13/o6osshareholderdividend.aspx [http://
perma.cc/U6NZ-LGZ3] (reporting that the "renewed share repurchase program strengthens
and extends our ability to repurchase shares at favorable prices for the benefit of long term
shareholders" (quoting David S. Wichmann, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial
Officer, UnitedHealth Group)).
130. See Amadeo De Cesari et al., The Effects of Ownership and Stock Liquidity on the Timing of Re-
purchase Transactions, 18 J. CoRP. FIN. 1023, 1O34 (2012).
131. Id. at 1046.
132. Id. at 1038-39.
133. See Azi Ben-Rephael et al., Do Firms Buy Their Stock at Bargain Prices? Evidence from Actual
Stock Repurchase Disclosures, i8 REV. FIN. 1299 (2013) (finding, in a sample of firms during
the years 2004 to 2009, that firms buy back their shares at a lower than average price, and
that firm repurchase activity is positively related to firm insiders buying shares for their per-
sonal portfolios); Amy K. Dittmar & Laura Casares Field, Can Managers Time the Market?
Evidence Using Repurchase Price Data (Mich. Ross Sch. of Bus. Working Paper No. 1234, May
2014), http://ssm.com/abstract=2423344 [http://perma.cc/TL68-Q7DL] (finding, in a sam-
ple of firms during the years 2004 to 2011, that firms buy back their shares at a lower than
average price, and that firms whose insiders bought shares for their own portfolios bought
at particularly low prices).
1590
124: 15S4 2015
THE UNEASY CASE FOR FAVORING LONG-TERM SHAREHOLDERS
b. Post-Repurchase Stock Returns
The movement of stock prices following repurchases also suggests that
many repurchases are driven by the desire to buy stock at a low price. Re-
searchers have repeatedly found that companies announcing OMRs experience,
on average, cumulative abnormal (market-adjusted) returns of approximately
25% over the next four years.3 4 These abnormal returns suggest that firms an-
nouncing OMRs were, on average, 20% undervalued at the time of the OMR
announcement.
However, as I noted earlier, many firms announcing OMRs do not actually
buy back any stock.3' We would expect firms that announce OMRs and then
actually repurchase shares to be more undervalued, on average, than all firms
announcing OMRs. Indeed, one study found that "value" firms (those with a
high book-to-market ratio) that had announced repurchases and subsequently
repurchased more than 4% of their shares in the following year experienced av-
erage four-year post-announcement abnormal returns of 57%.'36 These subse-
134. See, e.g., Konan Chan et al., Economic Sources of Gain in Stock Repurchases, 39 J. FIN. &
QuANTITATWvE ANALYSIS 461, 463 (2004) (finding that shares of firms announcing repur-
chases earn abnormal returns of 6.7% in the first year following the announcement and
23.6% over the subsequent four years); Urs Peyer & Theo Vermaelen, The Nature and Persis-
tence of Buyback Anomalies, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 1693, 1699 tbl.2 (2009) (finding, in a large
sample of firms announcing OMRs, a 24.25% cumulative market-adjusted return over the
forty-eight months following OMR announcements). Such large abnormal post-
announcement returns are also found outside the United States. See Alberto Manconi et al.,
Buybacks Around the World: Market Timing, Governance and Regulation 18-21 (Eur. Corp.
Governance Inst. Fin. Working Paper No. 436/2o14, Aug. 2014), http://ssrn.com
/abstract=233o8o7 [http://perma.cc/X8VG-663] (finding, in a large sample of non-U.S.
firms announcing repurchases, similar abnormal returns over the four years following re-
purchase announcements).
135. See supra Part IV.A. There are at least two reasons why managers announcing OMRs may
not follow through with any repurchases. First, managers might announce a repurchase that
they have no plan to conduct simply to boost the stock price so they can unload their own
shares at a higher price. See Fried, supra note 121, at 1351-56 (developing the argument that
executives can use repurchase announcements for false signaling and providing anecdotal
accounts of such false signaling). Indeed, a recent paper finds evidence of such "false signal-
ing." See Konan Chan et al., Share Repurchases as a Potential Tool To Mislead Investors, 16 J.
CORP. FIN. 137, 139 (2010) (finding evidence consistent with the fact that executives at poor-
ly performing firms make share repurchase announcements without an intention to repur-
chase shares). Second, managers may announce an OMR to give the firm an option to ac-
quire stock at a cheap price- an option that they may decline to exercise if the stock price
does not turn out to be low. See Ikenberry & Vermaelen, supra note 118, at io-ii.
136. In contrast, firms that did not subsequently repurchase any shares experienced no observa-
ble post-announcement abnormal (that is, market-adjusted) returns. See Konan Chan et al.,
Do Managers Time the Market? Evidence from Open-Market Share Repurchases, 31 J. BANKING &
FIN. 2673, 2676, 2686-88 (2007).
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quent returns provide additional evidence that managers currently use repur-
chases to shift value from selling shareholders to long-term shareholders.'37 In-
deed, such studies have led economists to conclude that repurchasing stock at a
low price has become a widespread practice.'
Not surprisingly, there is evidence of a link between managerial stock own-
ership (which aligns managers with long-term shareholder interests) and the
propensity to undertake bargain repurchases. One study found that abnormal
returns following repurchase announcements, which are associated with pre-
repurchase underpricing, are positively correlated with pre-buyback executive
stock ownership. 39 Another study compared executive stock ownership in two
types of repurchasing firms: (i) relatively infrequent repurchasers, which are
likely to engage in opportunistic bargain repurchasing when the stock price is
low; and (2) relatively steady repurchasers, which are likely to repurchase
shares to acquire stock for employee-option programs and to distribute cash
rather than to buy back stock at a low price. It found that relatively infrequent
repurchasers tend to have higher levels of executive ownership.'4 ° Both of these
studies suggest that executives are more likely to engage in bargain-price re-
purchases when their interests are more aligned with those of long-term share-
holders.
V. DESTROYING VALUE IN A REPURCHASING FIRM TO BOOST
LONG-TERM SHAREHOLDER RETURNS
Part IV explained that managers can and do use bargain repurchases to
shift value from selling shareholders to long-term shareholders. If these bar-
gain repurchases were economically costless, they would merely shift value
among different types of shareholders without reducing the size of the pie.
Managers could boost long-term shareholder returns without destroying value.
137. For an explanation of why U.S. insider trading law enables managers to use inside infor-
mation in deciding when the firm should repurchase shares, see Fried, Insider Trading, supra
note 21 (explaining that much insider trading by firms is legal under current law and that il-
legal insider trading is often difficult to detect and deter, especially given the lax reporting
requirements imposed on firms trading in their own shares).
138. See, e.g., Malcolm Baker & Jeffrey Wurgler, Market Timing and Capital Structure, 57 J. FIN. 1,
28-29 (2002) (reporting that equity market timing-having the firm buy shares at a low price
and issue shares at a high price-is an "important aspect" of actual corporate finance prac-
tice).
139. See Elias Raad & H.K. Wu, Insider Trading Effects on Stock Returns Around Open-Market Stock
Repurchase Announcements: An Empirical Study, 18 J. FIN. REs. 4S, S7 (1995).
14o. See Murali Jagannathan & Clifford Stephens, Motives for Multiple Open-Market Repurchase
Programs, 32 FIN. MGMT. 71, 71-72 (2003).
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Unfortunately, however, the use of bargain repurchases can give rise to eco-
nomic costs that shrink the pie.
This Part describes two such costs. Part V.A explains that the use of bargain
share repurchases to boost long-term shareholder returns can destroy econom-
ic value by inefficiently shrinking the firm. Part V.B explains that managers
can, and do, benefit long-term shareholders by engaging in costly price-
depressing manipulation around share repurchases.
A. Costly Contraction
The use of bargain repurchases to benefit long-term shareholders can lead
to "costly contraction": managers seeking to buy back stock at a low price may
give up economically valuable projects to fund the repurchase, reducing the to-
tal amount of value available to all the firm's shareholders over time.
1. How Inefficient Capital Allocation Can Benefit Long-Term Shareholders
From an economic perspective, a firm should distribute cash to sharehold-
ers via a repurchase (or dividend) if, and only if, total economic value will be
increased. 41 For example, suppose that the firm is considering distributing
$1oo in cash. If an outside project would yield a 15% return and an inside pro-
ject would yield lo%, the cash should be distributed. But if the best outside
project available to shareholders would yield a lo% return and an inside project
would yield a 15% return, then the cash should not be distributed.
Importantly, from this perspective, the firm's stock price should not be a
relevant consideration in determining whether the firm should distribute cash
via a repurchase. The stock price affects only the distribution of value among
different types of shareholders. The only relevant consideration is whether the
total economic pie will be bigger or smaller as a result of the repurchase.
However, as we saw in Part IV, managers make payout decisions based on
the stock price: when the stock price is low, they initiate or accelerate repur-
chases. When managers use an extraneous factor such as the stock price to de-
termine the timing of payout, payout policy can become distorted from an eco-
nomic perspective.
Consider our simple analytical framework involving ABC Corporation. Re-
call that, absent a repurchase (or equity issuance), the payoff to long-term
shareholders is $V/2. If there is a repurchase, and no value is created or de-
stroyed, then the payoff to long-term shareholders is $ (V-P). Therefore, long-
141. See Fried, Repurchases, supra note 21, at 135.
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term shareholders benefit (assuming no value is created or destroyed) from a
repurchase whenever $P < $V/2. If, however, $X of economic value must be
destroyed to effect the repurchase, long-term shareholders will still be better
off with a repurchase as long as $(V-P-X) > $V/2, that is, whenever $P <
$(V/2-X).
It might be helpful to offer a numerical example. Suppose that ABC has
$1o in fixed assets and $8o in cash that, if invested in a firm project, will yield
a return of 12.5% (or $1o). Assume, for simplicity, that any cash distributed by
ABC will generate a 0% return outside the firm. If ABC does not repurchase a
share in the short term, $V will equal $200 ($ilo+$8o+$io), and the long-
term shareholder payout ($V/2) will equal $1oo. Suppose that, in the short
term, ABC's shares trade at $80. If ABC repurchases a single share for $80, $V
will equal $19o ($11o+$8o), and the long-term shareholder payout $(V-P) will
equal $iio. The long-term shareholder payout is higher if managers distribute
cash that would generate $io more economic value inside the firm.42
Who loses if ABC's managers distribute cash that could generate a larger
return inside the firm? Not the short-term shareholder, who would have sold
its share for $80 in any event (but to a future shareholder, rather than to ABC).
Indeed, if we relax the example's assumptions a little bit and consider the pos-
sibility that the repurchase might boost the short-term stock price (by, among
other things, increasing competition for the short-term shareholder's share),
then the repurchase might actually benefit the short-term shareholder. The
loser is the future shareholder, which would have purchased a share for $8o
(assuming, as I do in the example, that the repurchase does not boost the
short-term stock price) that is actually worth $1oo.
From a current-shareholder perspective, the outcome of costly contraction
might not be objectionable. The long-term shareholder and the short-term
shareholder come out ahead, jointly and perhaps even individually. But from
an economic perspective, which takes into account the size of the total pie pro-
duced by the firm over time for all of its shareholders, current and future, de-
stroying $1o of economic value to boost the payouts for current shareholders is
undesirable.
142. Cf. Onur Bayar et al., Payout Policy Under Heterogeneous Beliefs: A Theory of Dividends Versus
Stock Repurchases, Price Impact, and Long-Run Stock Returns 3-4 (Oct. 2013) (unpublished
manuscript), http://ssrn.conVabstract=2287322 [http://perma.cc/KWE-2DsA] (offering a
model in which the existence of heterogeneous beliefs about the value of a firm's project
may cause managers seeking to maximize the long-term stock price to underinvest in the
project in order to buy back shares at a low price).
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2. Must Economic Value Be Sacrificed To Engage in Bargain Repurchases?
One might argue that a firm repurchasing its stock should be able to pursue
both the valuable project and buy back stock that trades at a low price. In a
world of perfectly efficient capital markets, this objection would have consider-
able force: the firm should be able to borrow cheaply enough to buy its own
stock and invest in valuable new projects . 4 3
However, as I have explained elsewhere,' a firm may not be able to bor-
row enough money to fund the desirable project while also buying back stock
at a low price. First, as economists have long understood, the information
asymmetry between lenders and the firm may make it difficult for the firm to
borrow money cost-effectively.4 From their perches inside the firm, managers
may understand that the firm's prospects are good. But lenders outside the
firm, who have less information than the managers, may not be as confident.
They may insist on loan terms that make the costs of financing the desirable
project higher than the benefits.
Second, the firm's contractual arrangements with other lenders might im-
pede additional debt financing. Even if Lender A were willing to lend to the
firm on cost-effective terms, loan covenants with Lenders B, C, and D might
bar the firm from borrowing additional funds (from Lender A or any other
creditor). 46 While renegotiation is possible in theory, it might be difficult in
practice, particularly if the borrower must simultaneously renegotiate with
multiple creditors to obtain the modifications needed to facilitate the new in-
vestment.
In short, firms may need to choose between engaging in a bargain price re-
purchase and funding desirable projects. Indeed, empirical evidence suggests
that repurchases often divert cash that would otherwise be used for research
and development and other productive investments in the firm. 47 For example,
one study found that repurchases appear to have a significantly negative effect
143. Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions when
Firms Have Information that Investors Do Not Have, 13 J. FIN. ECON. 187, 187 (1984).
144. See Fried, Repurchases, supra note 21, at 1125-26.
145. See Myers & Majluf, supra note 143.
146. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims
in Bankruptcy, 1o5 YALE L.J. 857, 879 (1996) (noting that the difficulty of specifying all pos-
sible contingencies is likely to cause covenants to be over-inclusive in some respects).
147. See, e.g., Daniel A. Bens et al., Real Investment Implications of Employee Stock Option Exercises,
40 J. ACCT. R.s. 359, 359 (2002) (finding evidence that firms that repurchase shares to satis-
fy option exercises exhibit subsequent declines in performance because the repurchases di-
vert cash from productive investments).
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on a firm's short-term investments and R&D, with a doubling of repurchases
leading to an 8% reduction in R&D expenditures. '
B. Costly Price-Depressing Manipulation Around Bargain Repurchases
We saw in Part III that managers serving short-term shareholders may en-
gage in costly price-boosting manipulation to lift the short-term stock price. We
will now see that managers serving long-term shareholders may engage in
costly price-depressing manipulation to reduce the short-term stock price
around bargain repurchases; indeed, there is evidence that such costly price
manipulation already occurs around repurchases.
As Part IV explained, long-term shareholder returns in a repurchasing firm
depend on the price at which the firm buys its own shares. Long-term share-
holders benefit when the repurchase price is low (relative to the no-transaction
value of the stock); the lower the price, the better off long-term shareholders
will be. Managers repurchasing cheap shares in the short term can therefore
benefit long-term shareholders by further depressing the short-term stock
price. 49
Importantly, managers can help long-term shareholders by manipulating
the stock price around repurchases even when some economic value is sacri-
ficed. In particular, assuming that long-term shareholders' losses from value
destruction are lower than the benefit of the reduced repurchase price, long-
term shareholders will prefer that managers engage in costly price-depressing
manipulation. ' 50
148. See Alok Bhargava, Executive Compensation, Share Repurchases and Investment Expenditures:
Econometric Evidence from US Firms, 40 REV. QUANTITATIVE FIN. &ACCT. 403, 419-20 (2013)
(concluding that repurchases, especially those that appear to be driven by executive stock
ownership, appear to have a significantly negative effect on a firm's investments and re-
search and development, with a doubling of repurchases leading to an 8% reduction in R&D
expenditures).
149. Note that long-term shareholders benefit from such manipulation even if the pre-
manipulation stock price is high relative to its actual value. If the pre-manipulation stock
price is high, but managers must conduct the repurchase anyway (perhaps to acquire shares
for employee stock-option programs), then reducing the stock price benefits long-term
shareholders by reducing the cost to them of indirectly acquiring high-price stock.
iso. Consider again ABC Corporation from Part IV.B. ABC initially has two shares outstanding
(one held by long-term shareholders and one held by short-term shareholders). It is liqui-
dated in the long term. ABC will repurchase short-term shareholders' single share in the
short term. There are two scenarios:
No Manipulation Scenario: Suppose that, if ABC does not depress its short-term stock
price, it will buy back a single share from its short-term shareholders for $1o and distribute
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In fact, there is evidence that managers manipulate prices before and dur-
ing repurchases, deliberately driving earnings and stock prices down to in-
crease the amount of value transferred to long-term shareholders. One study
examined 1720 OMR announcements between 1984 and 2002 that were fol-
lowed by actual repurchases during the quarter of the announcement or the
following quarter.' The study found significant negative earnings manipula-
tion among firms that announced and conducted OMRs, but not among firms
that announced OMRs but did not conduct them.
2
Not surprisingly, downward earnings manipulation was more aggressive in
firms in which the equity ownership of the CEO was higher- that is, when the
CEO's interests were more aligned with the interests of long-term sharehold-
ers." 3 This finding strongly suggests that, the more the board and manage-
ment focus on maximizing long-term shareholder value, the more likely man-
agers will be to engage in costly price-depressing manipulation.
To be sure, long-term shareholders will not always benefit from costly
price manipulation. If costly price manipulation destroys too much of the pie,
then long-term shareholders will be made worse off. But the important point is
that, just as short-term shareholders can benefit from costly price-boosting
manipulation that lifts the short-term stock price, long-term shareholders can
benefit from costly price-depressing manipulation of a kind that reduces the
short-term stock price when the firm is repurchasing shares.
It is also worth noting that unlike costly contraction, which can benefit
short-term shareholders and hurts (would-be) future shareholders, costly
Costly Manipulation Scenario: Now suppose that ABC can engage in price-depressing
manipulation (say, earnings management) in the short term that reduces the short-term
stock price $P by $2 (from $1o to $8). Assume that the manipulation reduces economic val-
ue ($V) by $i. ABC can thus buy back a single share for $8, but must give up an additional
$i of value to do so. The repurchase, coupled with costly price-depressing manipulation,
thus reduces $Vfrom $20 to $19. In the long term, the value of ABC's remaining share (held
by long-term shareholders) is $11 ($20-$8-$1).
Managers serving long-term shareholders will engage in costly price-depressing manip-
ulation around the repurchase because it boosts long-term shareholder payout from $1o to
$1i. But $1 of economic value is lost: in the No Manipulation Scenario, the pie ($V) is $20
($1o distributed in the long term and $io distributed in the short term); in the Costly Ma-
nipulation Scenario, the pie is $19 ($11 distributed in the long term, and $8 distributed in
the short term).
151. See Guojin Gong et al., Earnings Management and Firm Performance Following Open-Market
Repurchases, 63 J. FIN. 947, 956-57, 983 (2008) (reporting that firms adjust accruals to de-
crease their reported earnings before stock repurchases); cf Dichev et al., supra note 99, at
30 (reporting that 40% of earnings management is income-decreasing).
152. See Gong et al., supra note 151, at 948.
153. See id. at 983.
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price-depressing manipulation hurts short-term shareholders and benefits fu-
ture shareholders by causing the former to sell, and enabling the latter to buy,
at a lower price. Because this manipulation is value-destroying, the benefit to
long-term shareholders and future shareholders will, by definition, be less than
the cost to short-term shareholders.
We have seen that managers seeking to serve long-term shareholders may
cut back on economically desirable investments to buy stock at a low price and,
when repurchasing shares, waste resources trying to drive the stock price
down. We should not be surprised that managers in fact engage in these value-
wasting activities. They have been told by legal academics, business school pro-
fessors, and the courts not only that it is permissible to shift value from short-
term shareholders to long-term shareholders, but also that it may well be the
managers' duty to do so. And, of course, managers have compensation ar-
rangements tied to long-term shareholder value that incentivize them to act in
this manner.
VI. LONG-TERM SHAREHOLDER RETURNS IN AN ISSUING FIRM
We now turn to the "mirror image" of repurchases: equity issuances. Like
share repurchases, equity issuances decouple long-term shareholders' interests
from pie maximization. As we will see in Part VII, long-term shareholders in an
issuing firm, like long-term shareholders in a repurchasing firm, can benefit
when managers take steps that reduce the economic pie.
Part VI.A describes the widespread use of equity issuances. Part VI.B modi-
fies the analytical framework presented in Part III to explain how equity issu-
ances change the relationship between long-term shareholders' interests and
economic value. Part VI.C shows that long-term shareholders benefit when
managers sell stock at an inflated price, and it provides evidence that managers
currently engage in such "inflated-price" issuances."5 4
154. Just as my objective in Parts IV and V was not to systematically compare the interests of
short-term shareholders and long-term shareholders in repurchasing firms, my goal in this
Part is not to systematically compare the interests of long-term and short-term shareholders
in issuing firms. Rather, my objective is to show that issuances decouple long-term share-
holders' interests from value maximization in a shareholder-only firm. Therefore, I focus
here primarily on long-term shareholder interests, although I will mention in passing how
various value-destroying transactions that benefit long-term shareholders in an issuing firm
affect short-term shareholders. In Part VIII, I describe factors that are likely to affect wheth-
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A. Widespread Use of Equity Issuances
The typical publicly traded firm not only repurchases shares, but also issues
a considerable amount of shares over its life as a public firm. Indeed, issuances
typically exceed repurchases. For example, during each of the years in the peri-
od from 1993 to 2002, an average of 66.5% of large firms made net stock issues
(issuances less repurchases).' Strikingly, these net stock issuances averaged
7.5% of assets, which is on the same order of magnitude as net debt issuanc-
es.1s6 The fact that net issuances are so common and so large suggests that the
dollar volume of share issuances is the same order of magnitude as the dollar
volume of repurchases. Interestingly, the aggregate share count for S&P 5oo
firms has remained relatively stable over the last decade, 1 7 suggesting that the
number of shares issued is in the same ballpark as the number of shares repur-
chased. The dollar volume of repurchases averages approximately 15% of a
firm's market capitalization over five years.s 8 It appears that equity issuances
are of a similar magnitude, and thus that the total volume of equity issuances
and repurchases are approximately 30% of a firm's market capitalization over
five years.
While almost all repurchases take the form of OMRs, equity issuances
come in a variety of flavors. I will focus on two of the most important: (I) ac-
quisition-related issuances and (2) seasoned equity offerings.159
1. Acquisition-Related Issuances
Acquirers often issue equity to provide currency for purchasing the shares
of a target company, in part because the use of equity rather than cash can pro-
er long-term or short-term shareholder interests are better aligned with pie maximization in
a shareholder-only firm.
155. See Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, Financing Decisions: Who Issues Stock?, 76 J. FIN.
ECON. 549, 551 (2005).
156. Id. The figure for smaller firms was 12.6%, about twice as much as their net debt issues. Id.
157. See FactSet Buyback Quarterly, FACTSET (June 19, 2013), http://www.factset.com
/websitefiles/PDFs/buyback/buyback_6.i9.13 [http://perma.cc/EL83-98A8].
158. See supra Part W.A.
159. A third important flavor is equity issuances made in connection with executive and employ-
ee compensation programs. For example, among the largest 200 firms in 2007, the range of
shares allocated to equity compensation plans ranged from 0.92% of outstanding
shares to 62.6% of outstanding shares, with the median around 1o.5%. See 2oo8 Equity
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vide a tax benefit to the target shareholders.16' An example of such an acquisi-
tion (and one to which we will return in Part VJI.A) is AOL's acquisition of
Time Warner in 2000 for $162 billion in equity.
2. Seasoned Equity Offerings
Seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) raise cash to fund operations and strate-
gic investments, or to pay down debt.' 6, Many firms engage in SEOs, and the
amount of stock sold is substantial. 62 SEOs come in two forms: "firm com-
mitment" and "at-the-market" (ATM).
a. Firm-Commitment SEOs
Until relatively recently, SEOs were almost always "firm-commitment":
the firm arranges to sell a specified number of shares at a fixed price through
an underwriter that guarantees to sell the shares at that price and then offers
the shares to investors.163 When the market learns of a firm-commitment SEO,
the stock price tends to fall. 16 4 The market's reaction to SEO announcements is
not surprising, as an issuance may signal that the stock is overvalued.
b. At-The-Market Offerings
In part due to the adverse effect of firm-commitment SEOs on the stock
price, firms have taken advantage of recent regulatory changes to issue stock
via so-called "at-the-market" SEOs.i65 In an ATM, the firm sells shares directly
160. See Fama & French, supra note 155
, 
at 554 (explaining the tax advantage of using acquirer-
firm stock to purchase shares of targets).
16i. See id. at 573-75 (describing various purposes for stock issuances, including SEOs).
162. See Fangjian Fu, Overinvestment and the Operating Performance of SEO Firms, 39 FIN. MGMT.
249, 250 (2010) (reporting that, in a sample of 2873 SEOs from 198o to 1999, outstanding
shares increased by an average of 26%).
163. See B. Espen Eckbo et al., Security Offerings, in I HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE FINANCE: EMPm-
iCAL CORPORATE FINANCE 233, 243 (B. Espen Eckbo ed., 2007) (reporting that firm commit-
ment underwritings are "the primary choice of publicly traded U.S. firms" and explaining
that an underwriter syndicate guarantees the proceeds of the issue).
164. Id. at 315-18 (surveying studies of firm-commitment SEOs in the United States and report-
ing that, on average, there are significantly negative stock-price reactions to announcements
of these transactions); Tim Loughran & Jay R. Ritter, The New Issues Puzzle, 50 J. FIN. 23, 30
n.6 (1995) (collecting sources documenting that the stock price drops when an SEO is an-
nounced).
165. See Matthew T. Billett et al., At the Market (ATM) Offerings 2 n.1, 4 nn.5-6 (Nov. 12,
2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2178o52 [http://perma.cC/9MU2
16oo
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(and quietly) on the market through a sales agent. 66 A firm need not -and
typically does not -announce these sales as they are occurring, much as firms
do not announce OMR transactions as they take place.
Indeed, ATMs are marketed as a way for firms to issue shares quickly when
the price appears favorable without alerting the market to the issuance in real
time, 67 (which might cause the stock price to fall). As a recent article by several
securities lawyers put it, an ATM enables "the issuer [to] opportunistically take
advantage of stock price movements.1
6s
To be sure, investors know that an ATM might occur. Before conducting an
ATM, the firm must have an effective shelf registration statement (including a
prospectus) on file with the SEC. 6 , In these disclosures, the firm must indicate
either the maximum number of shares to be sold or the maximum proceeds
from the sales, and the firm must identify the sales agent.
170
However, these pre-transaction disclosures do not provide much useful in-
formation to future shareholders, for two reasons. First, these disclosures can
be updated at any time to increase the ceiling on the number of shares to be
sold. As a result, investors do not know the maximum number or value of
shares that will actually be sold. Second, the filing of these disclosures does not
compel the firm to enter into a single transaction. Like an OMR announce-
ment, an ATM filing gives a firm the option, but not the obligation, to trade in
its shares on the open market. Investors will not learn of a sale until months
after it takes place. 71 Consequently, managers have considerable ability to
-52NP] (describing how regulatory changes in 2005 and 2008 led to ATM issuances increas-
ing from 1% of total SEO volume in 2008 to io% of total SEO volume in 2012); Sigitas
Karpavicius & Jo-Ann Suchard, Institutional Oumership and the Rise of Shelf Offerings in U.S.
Equity Raisings 12 (June 6, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract
=1566730 [http://perma.cc/9LMs-NG69] (explaining that, from 1997 to 2007, the fraction
of equity issued through traditional SEOs dropped from 82% to 19%).
166. For a discussion of these offerings and their requirements, see James D. Small III et al., The
Resurgence of United States At-the-Market Equity Offerings to Raise Capital in Volatile Equity
Markets, 4 CAP. MARKETS L.J. 290, 291-300 (2009).
167. See David M. Carter et al., ATM Offerings-Flexible, Opportunistic Access to Capital,
MARTiNDALE-HUBBELL (Oct. 25, 201O), http://www.martindale.com/securities-law/article
_Troutman-Sanders-LLP_1171318.htm [http://perma.cc/9NG8-6FCN] (claiming that
"ATM offerings ... permit[] timely, opportunistic access to the capital markets" in part be-
cause of "minimal real-time disclosure of sales activity").
168. Small III et al., supra note 166, at 291.
169. Id. at 295-96.
170. Id. at 296.
171. Like firms conducting OMRs, firms conducting ATMs need not publicly disclose any in-
formation about ATM transactions until after the end of the quarter in which the transac-
tions took place. See id. at 302 (noting that some firms conducting ATMs disclose infor-
mation only on quarterly Form io-Qfilings). Indeed, while firms conducting OMRs must
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transfer value from future shareholders to long-term shareholders through
stealth sales of shares on the open market.
B. Analytical Framework: Decoupling Effect of Equity Issuances
To see how equity issuances decouple long-term shareholders' interests
from the pie, we modify the analytical framework introduced in Part II to con-
sider the scenario in which ABC Corporation issues a third share in the short
term for $P. I assume that the issuance does not create or destroy economic
value.
The periods are as follows:
" Today: ABC has two shares outstanding. One share is held by
short-term shareholders (denoted "ST"). One share is held by
long-term shareholders (denoted "LT").
" Short term: Short-term shareholders sell their one share to future
shareholders (denoted F). ABC also sells an additional share to fu-
ture shareholders. As a result, future shareholders acquire two
shares. In both transactions, the sale price is $P per share. The
price $P may or may not reflect the share's actual (full-
information) value.
* Long term: ABC's assets are sold for $(V+P) in cash, which reflects
their actual value. The amount $(V+P) is distributed to long-term
shareholders and future shareholders. There are a total of three
shares outstanding, so the holder of a share receives $(V+P)/ 3.
Long-term shareholders receive $(V+P)/3. Each future shareholder
also receives $(V+P)/3, for a total to future shareholders of
$2(V+P)/3.
The sequence of events is illustrated in Figure 3 below.
disclose the number of shares repurchased in each month of the preceding quarter and the
average price paid for each share, see supra Part IV.A, no such breakdown is required for
ATMs. In general, firms need report (for the preceding quarter) only the total number of
shares issued and the proceeds from those sales. Small III et al., supra note 166, at 302.
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Figure 3.













Buys for $P Receives $ (V+P)/3
]BuysforP 4 -- Receives$V+P)/3:
Although ABC's value in the long term is different from what it was in the
non-transacting case ($(V+P) instead of $V), economic value - the amount of
value flowing to shareholders over time -is the same: $V. The amount $(V+P)
flows to long-term shareholders and future shareholders in the long term, and
$P flowsfrom future shareholders to the firm in the short term.
The economic pie and payoffs to the different types of shareholders are
summarized in Table 3 below.
Table 3.
SHAREHOLDER PAYOFFS AND THE PIE IN AN ISSUING FIRM
Short-Term Long-Term Future Shareholders The Pie
Shareholders Shareholders
$P $(v+P)/3 $2[-P+(V+P)/3] $V
Unlike in the non-transacting case, but as in the repurchasing case, there is
a disconnect between long-term shareholder returns and the pie. As $P in-
creases, long-term shareholders' payoff rises, but the pie remains the same. Put
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tial short-term shareholder (one whose payoff is also linked to $P, the short-
term stock price).
C. Inflated-Price Issuances
The analysis offered in Part VI.B suggests that managers can transfer value
from future shareholders to long-term shareholders by conducting "inflated-
price issuances" -equity offerings at a price higher than the stock's actual val-
ue. Indeed, they frequently do so.
i. Economic Logic
An equity issuance has analogous distributional effects to a share repur-
chase. A share repurchase transfers value from short-term shareholders to
long-term shareholders when the stock price is lower than its actual value. A
stock issuance transfers value from future shareholders to long-term share-
holders when the stock price is higher than its actual value. Hence, managers
can benefit long-term shareholders by selling stock at an inflated price. 72
We can see this in terms of our ABC example. When ABC does not issue
equity (or repurchase stock), long-term shareholders will receive $V/2 for their
equity. But if ABC issues one share for $P, long-term shareholders will receive
$ (V+P)/3 for their equity. If $P > $V/2, long-term shareholders are better off.
Who loses from the sale of overpriced equity? In our example, the losers are
future shareholders, who buy overpriced shares. But stepping outside this
framework for a moment, we should note that a firm's sale of stock might not
increase the number of shares purchased by future shareholders; rather, it
might decrease the shares sold by short-term shareholders, who are partially
displaced by the firm's selling activity. If future shareholders buy the same
number of shares, and short-term shareholders sell fewer shares, then short-
term shareholders will lose from the sale of overpriced equity.
Of course, in the real world, a firm's sale of stock can be expected to have at
least some negative effect on the short-term stock price. This price effect, on
which I do not focus, would also need to be taken into account to fully deter-
mine which shareholders win and which shareholders lose, and by how much.
But the precise identity of the losing shareholders and the extent of their loss
172. See Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Stock Market Driven Acquisitions, 70 J. FIN. ECON.
295 (2003) (proposing that overvalued firms engage in stock-financed acquisitions so that
their long-term shareholders can benefit from obtaining hard assets at a discount); see also
Matthew Rhodes-Kropf & S. Viswanathan, Market Valuation and Merger Waves, 59 J. FIN.
268 5 (2004) (similar).
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are both irrelevant to the point that I wish to emphasize here -namely, that
long-term shareholders are better off when the firm sells overpriced stock.
2. Evidence of Inflated-Price Issuances
We saw in Part III that many managers acknowledge that their firms re-
purchase shares when the price is low.'73 Similarly, and not surprisingly, many
managers also acknowledge that they issue shares when they believe the stock
price is "high."74 Moreover, just as empirical studies repeatedly find that man-
agers tend to conduct repurchases at low prices, there is considerable evidence
that managers conduct equity issuances - either to acquire other firms or to
raise cash -when the stock is overpriced.
Turning first to acquisition-related issuances, firms tend to use overpriced
stock as consideration in acquisitions."5 Such acquisitions benefit the long-
term shareholders of the acquiring firms by enabling the acquiring firms to
purchase assets with overvalued currency, reducing the effective purchase price
paid. 176
Equity issuances for cash show a similar pattern. There is evidence, going
back decades and from around the world, that traditional SEOs are, on aver-
age, overpriced."7 A recent paper examining 26o0 SEOs between 1992 and
13. See Brav et al., supra note 127, at 514.
174. See John R. Graham & Campbell R. Harvey, The Theory and Practice of Corporate Finance:
Evidence from the Field, 60 J. FIN. ECON. 187, 216 tbl.8 (2001) (reporting results of a survey of
392 CFOs about their decision making around capital structure).
175. See, e.g., Ming Dong et al., Does Investor Misvaluation Drive the Takeover Market?, 61 J. FIN.
725, 757 (2006) (finding that overpriced firms are more likely to try to acquire other firms
that are less overpriced); Tim Loughran & Anand M. Vijh, Do Long-Term Shareholders Bene-
fit from Corporate Acquisitions?, 52 J. FIN. 1765, 1775 (1997) (finding that managers of acquir-
ing firms use stock to pay for the acquisitions when their firms' stock is likely to be overval-
ued and cash when their firms' stock is likely to be undervalued); Matthew Rhodes-Kropf et
al., Valuation Waves and Merger Activity: The Empirical Evidence, 77 J. FIN. ECON. 561, 6oo-oi
(2005) (concluding that the "vast majority" of mergers "involve highly overvalued bid-
ders").
176. See Pavel G. Savor & QO Lu, Do Stock Mergers Create Value for Acquirers?, 64 J. FIN. io6i,
1O63-64 (2009) (finding that the shares of a sample of stock-financed bidders that complet-
ed their acquisitions outperformed a control sample of stock-financed bidders that failed to
complete their acquisitions by about 25% to 30% over a three-year horizon, and demonstrat-
ing that the outperformance was due to the successful bidders' ability to acquire cheap as-
sets).
177. See, e.g., Baker & Wurgler, supra note 138, at 2 (reporting that equity market timing-having
the firm buy shares at a low price and issue shares at a high price- is an important aspect of
actual corporate finance practice); Loughran & Ritter, supra note 164, at 25, 47 (examining
3702 SEOs between 197o and 199o, and finding evidence consistent with the fact that firms
16o5
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2010 suggests the magnitude of this benefit. It finds that firms timing tradi-
tional SEOs boost average returns to long-term shareholders by approximately
3% over the subsequent three years.' 78 Importantly, and not surprisingly, the
propensity to engage in inflated-price issuances appears to increase with insid-
er equity ownership - that is, as managers' interests become more aligned with
those of long-term shareholders. 79
Although ATMs are relatively new, the evidence now emerging is con-
sistent with insiders' using ATMs to sell overvalued equity. For example, one
recent study finds that ATMs are announced after significant stock price run-
ups and that the market reacts negatively to their announcement.'8 This study
also finds that actual sales under ATM programs are executed after the stock
price has recently risen and market conditions are relatively favorable.'" These
findings should not be surprising, since ATMs are marketed to firms as a
method of enabling managers to issue shares quickly when the price appears
favorable without alerting the market to the issuance and causing the stock
price to fall. 82 We can expect ATMs, like traditional SEOs, to be used to trans-
fer value from future shareholders to long-term shareholders. 8
"announce stock issues when their stock is grossly overvalued," that the market fails to re-
value these firms' shares appropriately, and that these shares remain "overvalued when the
issue occurs"); Jeffrey Pontiff & Artemiza Woodgate, Share Issuance and Cross-Sectional Re-
turns, 63 J. FIN. 921, 943-44 (2008) (finding evidence of post-SEO stock underperformance
in a recent sample of U.S. SEOs). Equity issuances outside the U.S. also tend to be over-
priced. Brian J. Henderson et al., World Markets for Raising New Capital, 82 J. FIN. ECON. 63,
66 (2006) (examining equity issuances around the world and concluding that "firms are
more likely to issue equity when the stock market appears to be overvalued").
178. See Ilona Babenko et al., Agency Implications of Equity Market Timing 54 (Ariz. State Univ.,
Working Paper, 2013) (reporting that, for firms timing SEOs, the average additional three-
year return created for long-term shareholders was 3.21%).
179. See Eric R. Brisker et al., Executive Compensation Structure and the Motivations for Seasoned
Equity Offerings, 40 J. BANKING & FIN. 330, 331 (2014) (finding that managers owning rela-
tively large amounts of equity are more likely to engage in inflated-price issuances than oth-
er managers); cf Sudip Datta et al., Executive Compensation Structure and Corporate Equity Fi-
nancing Decisions, 78 J. Bus. 1859, 1886-87 (2005) (finding, in a sample of 444 SEO
announcements occurring between 1992 and 1999, that the market reacted more negatively
to announcements by firms in which managers owned more equity).
iso. See Billett et al., supra note 165, at 17-18 (finding, in a sample of ATMs between 2008 and
2012, that ATMs are announced following abnormal stock price increases and that their an-
nouncements are associated with an average negative abnormal stock decline of 3%).
181. See id. at 23-24 (finding that more positive stock returns in the prior quarter lead to larger
actual issuances in the current quarter).
182. As one practitioner's article candidly stated, in an at-the-market SEO, "the issuer can oppor-
tunistically take advantage of stock price movements." Small III et al., supra note 166, at 291.
183. For an explanation of why U.S. insider trading law enables managers to use inside infor-
mation in deciding when the firm should issue shares, see Fried, Insider Trading, supra note
16o6
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It is worth pausing here to reflect on the fact that corporate lawyers in the
United States feel comfortable advising firms to adopt arrangements that allow
managers to transfer value from future shareholders to current shareholders. In
a regime such as the United Kingdom's, in which managers are considered to
owe a fiduciary duty to both current and future shareholders,18 4 lawyers might
think twice before advising firms to use inside information to secretly sell
shares to future shareholders at a price that benefits current shareholders. But
in the United States, where it is considered self-evident that managers owe a
duty only to current shareholders' and therefore can and should use any legal
means to transfer value from future shareholders to current shareholders, ad-
vising firms to do so might seem not only natural but also desirable.
VII. DESTROYING VALUE IN AN ISSUING FIRM TO BOOST LONG-
TERM SHAREHOLDER RETURNS
Part VI explained that managers can and do use inflated-price issuances to
shift value from future shareholders to long-term shareholders. If these issu-
ances were economically costless, then they would merely shift value among
different types of shareholders without reducing the size of the pie. Unfortu-
nately, however, managers serving long-term shareholders may destroy eco-
nomic value through inflated-price issuances to enrich long-term shareholders.
This Part examines two types of potential economic costs associated with
inflated-price issuances. Part VII.A explains that managers using inflated-price
equity issuances to benefit long-term shareholders may engage in "costly ex-
pansion" - inefficiently moving assets from outside to inside the firm. Part
VII.B explains that managers engaged in inflated-price issuances can further
benefit long-term shareholders by engaging in costly price-boosting manipula-
tion around the issuances.
A. Costly Expansion
Managers serving long-term shareholders may increase the size of the firm
through the sale of overpriced equity, even though the expansion may destroy
economic value.
21, at 822-24 (explaining that some kinds of insider trading by firms is legal under current
law and that illegal insider trading is often difficult to detect and deter, especially given the
lax trade reporting requirements imposed on firms conducting ATMs).
184. See supra note 90.
185. See supra note 88.
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1. Economic Logic
We saw in Part V that a repurchase can reduce economic value by distrib-
uting cash that, from the perspective of all the firm's current and future share-
holders, could generate higher returns if invested in the firm's own projects.
Analogously, an equity issuance can reduce economic value if the equity issu-
ance causes the firm to absorb assets that would generate more value outside
the firm. Furthermore, just as long-term shareholders can benefit from manag-
ers' sacrificing valuable in-firm projects to buy back stock at a low price, they
can benefit from managers' acquiring assets at a discount through the use of
overpriced stock that would generate more economic value outside the firm.
86
2. AOL-Time Warner Transaction
Do real-life long-term shareholders actually benefit from the sale of over-
priced equity to finance a value-destroying acquisition? From an ex post per-
spective, one can certainly find many examples in which long-term sharehold-
ers of acquirers benefit from value-wasting acquisitions financed with inflated
186. A numerical example involving ABC Corporation from Part VI.B may help clarify. As be-
fore, ABC initially has two shares outstanding and is liquidated in the long term. One share
is held by long-term shareholders, the other by short-term shareholders. Consider two sce-
narios:
No Expansion Scenario: Suppose that, if ABC does not issue another share prior to the
long term, future shareholders will buy the short-term shareholders' single share in the
short term, and ABC will distribute $20 to the holders of its two shares in the long term. In
other words, $V = $2o. The no-transaction value of each of ABC's two shares in the long
term will be $1o ($V/2).
Costly Expansion Scenario: Now suppose that ABC can conduct an equity issuance in the
short term when $P (the short-term stock price) equals $14 ($4 more than its actual value of
$io), selling a share directly to future shareholders (who also purchase the short-term
shareholders' share). ABC's value in the long term is $(V + 14 + X), where X is the change in
value caused by the equity issuance. Assume that the $14 received increases ABC's value by
$13, from $2o to $33, because $i of value is lost as a result of moving assets into the firm. (In
other words, X = -$1.) Thus, in the long term, the value of each of ABC's three shares, in-
cluding the one held by long-term shareholders, is $11.
Managers serving long-term shareholders will expand the firm, because it increases
long-term shareholders' payout from $1o to $ii. However, the expansion reduces economic
value. In the No Expansion Scenario, the pie is $20; in the Costly Expansion Scenario, the
pie is $19 ($33 distributed in the long term less $14 received from shareholders in the short
term).
For a similar example showing that executives compensated with stock may engage in
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stock. If there were a poster child for such a transaction, it would likely be
AOL's acquisition of Time Warner in 2000.87
AOL used $162 billion of stock to acquire Time Warner. 88 The companies
had roughly equivalent market capitalizations before the merger. A hypothet-
ical AOL shareholder owning 2% of AOL before the merger thus would have
ended up with approximately 1% of the combined firm.
This transaction is now widely seen as a disaster. 8 9 There can be little
doubt, from an ex post perspective, that the acquisition destroyed economic
value. The expected synergy benefits failed to materialize. In fact, AOL and
Time Warner parted ways nine years later,' 90 suggesting that synergy effects
were actually negative. The economic costs of this failed marriage included the
transaction costs associated with combining and then splitting the businesses,
as well as the negative synergy costs incurred while keeping the two firms sta-
pled together.
Nevertheless, AOL's long-term shareholders appear to have benefitted
from the transaction. When AOL and Time Warner separated in 2009, AOL
was worth $2.5 billion, while Time Warner was valued at about $36 billion,19'
for a combined value of about $39 billion. Assuming AOL would have been
worth the same ($2.5 billion) in 2009 had it not acquired Time Warner in
2000, our hypothetical 2% AOL shareholder would (absent the merger) have
owned shares worth $5o million. Instead, as a result of the merger, that share-
holder would have owned 1% of AOL (an interest worth $25 million) and 1% of
Time Warner (an interest worth $360 million), for a total value of approxi-
mately $385 million -more than seven times the value of her hypothetical no-
transaction stake in AOL.
To be clear, I am not claiming that the AOL-Time Warner deal was driven
by AOL managers seeking to serve long-term shareholders through costly ex-
187. See Tim Arango, How the AOL-Time Warner Merger Went So Wrong, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 11,
20O, http://www.nytimes.com/2oio/o1/11/business/media/llmerger.html [http://perma.cc
/7VHH-M73H] (reporting that the 2000 deal valued the combined firm at $350 billion, and
that ten years later the combined value of the companies, which have since separated, was
about one-seventh of their combined value on the day of the merger).
188. See Daniel Okrent, AOL-Time Warner Merger: Happily Ever After?, TimE, Jan.
24, 2000, http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/o,9171,995889,oo.html [http://
perma.cc/NM4S-3STJ] (reporting that the transaction was an all-stock acquisition for about
$162 billion of AOL stock).
18g. See, e.g., Arango, supra note 187 (reporting that the AOL-Time Warner transaction is taught
in business schools as the "worst in history").
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pansion. AOL's managers may or may not have believed that AOL was over-
priced, and they may or may not have believed that the merger would destroy
economic value. I describe AOL's acquisition of Time Warner simply to offer a
concrete example of how long-term shareholders can benefit ex post from a
transaction that destroyed economic value.
3. Must Value Be Destroyed To Issue Overpriced Equity?
We have seen that long-term shareholders can be made better off if their
firm issues overpriced equity for value-wasting acquisitions (rather than re-
frains from doing so). But long-term shareholders would be even better off if
the firm could use inflated-price issuances to acquire assets that do not decrease
in value when brought into the firm. In particular, long-term shareholders
would prefer managers of firms with overpriced stock to either (a) acquire as-
sets, via an acquisition-related issuance, that do not decrease in value when
brought into the firm; or (b) engage in an SEO and invest the cash in a way
that enhanced (or at least did not waste) economic value.
However, in many situations, these two alternatives might either be una-
vailable or deliver less value to long-term shareholders than costly expansion.
Consider first the possibility of conducting an acquisition-related issuance
aimed at bringing "good" assets (assets that do not lose value when acquired)
into the firm. To begin, the firm may be at its optimal scale and scope, so that
expanding the firm can only shrink the economic pie. In addition, even if the
firm could be expanded in ways that did not reduce long-term economic value,
it may not always be possible to find and acquire good assets during the win-
dow when the acquirer's stock is overpriced. If good assets are unavailable dur-
ing this window, long-term shareholders might be better off if managers en-
gage in a value-destroying acquisition rather than no acquisition at all.192
Next, consider the possibility of conducting an SEO (and not mis-investing
the cash). In theory, long-term shareholders would be better off if managers
did not engage in a value-wasting acquisition, but instead sold overpriced equi-
ty for cash and then either kept or distributed the cash to shareholders, avoid-
ing any shrinkage of the pie. But a firm conducting an SEO, whether tradition-
al or ATM, must inform its old and new investors of the purpose of the
192. An overpriced acquirer could, in theory, avoid significant value destruction by using its
stock to purchase the stock of a target, keeping the target in a subsidiary, and then spinning
it off to shareholders. But its plans to do so would need to be disclosed to the market, which
would then infer that the acquirer's stock was overpriced and revalue the shares, making it
more difficult for the firm to issue overpriced equity.
161o
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financing. 9 3 If the firm announces that it will take all of the funds raised and
hold them in cash or distribute them to shareholders, then investors are likely
to infer that the firm is issuing stock merely to exploit the fact that it is over-
priced. 94 Investors might then lower their valuations of the firm, making it
more difficult for the firm to sell overpriced equity through the SEO. Thus,
managers can be expected to indicate that the money raised will be used for in-
vestment.
Not surprisingly, there is evidence that managers conducting SEOs to sell
overpriced stock normally accumulate excessive capital rather than distribute
the cash to shareholders. One study, by Robert Chirinko and Huntley Schaller,
examined publicly traded U.S. firms during the period from 1980 tO 2004 and
concluded that high-priced firms with poor investment opportunities accumu-
lated between 15% and 45% of excessive capital while they were overpriced.9 '
Another study of firms undertaking SEOs between 198o and 1999 found that
these firms dramatically increased investment rather than retiring debt or in-
creasing working capital, and that this spike in investment tended to reduce re-
turns on assets by an economically and statistically significant amount. 
96
In sum, the "first best" outcome for long-term shareholders of a firm with
overvalued stock that cannot efficiently absorb new assets would be for manag-
ers to issue overpriced shares and distribute the cash to the firm's shareholders.
But managers must disclose the purpose of the equity issuance, and disclosing
that managers will distribute the issuance proceeds to shareholders will clearly
signal that the firm is issuing shares solely because they are overpriced, causing
the stock price to fall. Therefore, the "second best" outcome for long-term
193. See, e.g., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, REGISTRATION STATEMENT UNDER THE SECURITIES
ACT OF 1933, OMB No. 3235-0073, at lo (Form S- 3), http://www.sec.gov/about/forms
/forms-3.pdf [http://perma.cc/XMP2-74HZ] (requiring a stock issuer to furnish the infor-
mation required by Item 504 of Regulation S-K, namely the "principal purposes for which
the proceeds are to be used").
194. See, e.g., Merritt B. Fox, Civil Liability and Mandatory Disclosure, 109 COLUM. L. REv. 237, 262
& n.65 (2009).
195. See Robert S. Chirinko & Huntley Schaller, Do Bubbles Lead to Overinvestment?: A
Revealed Preference Approach (CESifo Working Paper No. 3491, 2011), http://ssrn.com
/abstract=1865173 [http://perma.cc/FRJ7-Y89QJ (examining publicly traded U.S. firms
during the period 198o to 2004 and concluding that high-priced firms with poor investment
opportunities accumulated between i5% and 45% of excessive capital while they were over-
priced); see also Ming Dong et al., Stock Market Misvaluation and Corporate Investment 4
(Munich Personal RePEc Archive, Paper No. 3109, 2007), http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen
.de/31o9 [http://perma.cc/XZ4S-GFJ6] (finding that cash raised by overpriced firms issuing
equity is used to increase investment).
196. See Fu, supra note 162, at 250-51.
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shareholders may well be for managers to engage in costly expansion, rather
than refrain from issuing the equity.
B. Costly Price-Boosting Manipulation Around Inflated-Price Equity Issuances
Just as managers serving long-term shareholders may engage in costly
price-depressing manipulation around bargain repurchases to further depress the
stock price, these managers may engage in costly price-boosting manipulation
around inflated-price issuances to further boost the stock price. Indeed, there is
evidence that managers routinely manipulate the stock price around equity is-
suances.'9 7
1. Economic Logic
We saw in Part VI that long-term shareholder payoffs depend on the price
at which the firm issues additional shares. Long-term shareholders benefit
when the issuance price is high (relative to the no-transaction value of the
stock). The higher the stock price, the greater the benefit. Thus, managers is-
suing shares at an inflated price can boost long-term shareholder returns by
raising the issuance price.' 98
Importantly, managers can serve the interests of long-term shareholders by
manipulating the stock price around issuances even if some economic value
must be sacrificed to do so. In particular, as long as long-term shareholders'
losses from the value destruction are lower than their benefit from an issuance
at a higher price, long-term shareholders will prefer that managers engage in
costly price-boosting manipulation.' 99
197. See infra Part VII.B.2.
198. Similarly, if managers were required to issue stock when the issuance price is low (say, to
raise capital when cheaper sources of capital are unavailable), then manipulating the stock
price so that it is higher would benefit long-term shareholders by reducing their losses on
the cheap issuance.
199. Consider again ABC Corporation from Part VI.B. As before, it has two shares outstanding
initially (one held by long-term shareholders), and will be liquidated in the long term. In
the short term, ABC will sell a third share to future shareholders. Consider two scenarios:
No Manipulation Scenario: Suppose that, if ABC does not manipulate its short-term
stock price, it will sell a third share at the short-term stock price ($P) for $io, and it will dis-
tribute $30 to the holders of its three shares in the long term ($V = $3o-$1o = $20). The no-
manipulation price of each of ABC's three shares in the long term, including that held by
long-term shareholders, will be $io ($30/3).
Costly Manipulation Scenario: Now suppose that, by destroying $1 of value, ABC's man-
agers can boost the short-term stock price by $4. Instead of having $30 to distribute to the
holders of three shares in the long term, there will be $33 ($4 extra received from future
1612
124:1554 2015
THE UNEASY CASE FOR FAVORING LONG-TERM SHAREHOLDERS
To be sure, long-term shareholders will not always benefit from costly
price manipulation. If costly price manipulation destroys too much economic
value, then long-term shareholders will be made worse off. But the critical
point is that even long-term shareholders, just like short-term shareholders,
may benefit from costly price-boosting manipulation: °°
2. Evidence of Costly Price-Boosting Manipulation Around Equity Issuances
Managers already engage in costly price-boosting manipulation around eq-
uity offerings -both acquisition-related issuances and SEOs. Turning first to
acquisition-related issuances, managers engage in earnings manipulation when
issuing stock to acquire another company." One study of mergers announced
between January 1992 and December 2000 found that, in acquisitions in which
acquirer-firm stock is used as consideration, acquiring firms show significant
positive accruals in the quarter before the announcement."2
AOL again offers a useful illustration. During the period in which AOL ac-
quired Time Warner, AOL's managers engaged in aggressive, costly price-
shareholders, less $1 value destroyed). In the long term, each of ABC's shares will be worth
$11.
Managers serving long-term shareholders will engage in costly price-boosting manipu-
lation because it will boost long-term shareholder payoffs from $io to $n. But such ma-
nipulation will reduce economic value. In the No Manipulation Scenario, the pie is $20: $30
is distributed to shareholders in the long term, and $io is received from shareholders in the
short term. In the Costly Manipulation Scenario, the pie is $19: $33 is distributed to share-
holders in the long term, and $14 is received from shareholders in the short term.
200. One potential form of costly price-boosting manipulation is illegal earnings manipulation. If
such manipulation is detected, the firm can be required to pay damages. In terms of my
framework, illegal earnings manipulation that occurs in the short term might lead to the
payment of damages by the firm in the long term. One might thus wonder how this particu-
lar form of costly price-boosting manipulation can benefit long-term shareholders.
However, it might be difficult to prove (let alone detect) illegal earnings manipulation
before the long term arrives. If such manipulation is detected, the firm might be able to set-
tle the case for a relatively small amount. And any damages paid will not come solely at the
expense of long-term shareholders; part of any damages paid by the firm will come (indi-
rectly) out of the pockets of the injured future shareholders. Therefore, in expectation, long-
term shareholders may well be able to benefit even from this form of costly price-boosting
manipulation.
201. See, e.g., Merle Erickson & Shiing-wu Wang, Earnings Management by Acquiring Firms in
Stock for Stock Mergers, 27 J. ACCT. & ECON. 149, 151 (1999) (finding, in a sample of stock-
financed mergers between 1985 and 199o, that acquirers managed earnings upward before
announcing the merger).
202. See Henock Louis, Earnings Management and the Market Performance of Acquiring Firms, 74 J.
FIN. ECON. 121, 134,136 tbl.4 (2004) (finding that acquiring firms overstate earnings prior to
stock-for-stock acquisitions).
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boosting manipulation: they massively inflated advertising revenues.0 3 The
combined entity was later sued by the SEC, the Justice Department, and share-
holders, and forced to pay $2.5 billion to investors and the government.2 °4 (The
settlement somewhat reduced the gains accruing to AOL's long-term share-
holders from the costly price-boosting manipulation that occurred before and
during the acquisition.)" 5
Next, consider SEOs. Firms conducting traditional SEOs may attempt to
206boost their stock prices by engaging in real earnings management, earnings
manipulation,7 or a combination of the two. One study, examining 1S11 com-
pleted traditional SEOs during the period from 1987 to 2006, found that firms
conducting these SEOs engaged in both accruals management and real earn-
ings management."
Given that long-term shareholders are the investors most likely to benefit
from costly price-boosting manipulation around equity issuances, it is not sur-
203. See David A. Vise, Time Warner Settles AOL Cases for $51o Million, WASH. POST, Dec.
16, 2004, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A430-2004Decl5.html [http://
perma.cc/sZME-TXFC] (reporting that AOL agreed to pay the government $51o million to
settle criminal and civil allegations that AOL manipulated its revenue before the acquisi-
tion).
204. See id.; Time Warner in $2.5B Fraud Settlement, CNN MONEY, Aug. 3, 2005, http://money
.cnn.com/2005/08/o3/news/fortune5oo/timewarner settlement/index.htm [http://perma.cc
/FCMs-AEL8] (reporting that Time Warner will pay $2.4 billion to shareholders who ac-
quired AOL or Time Warner stock during the inflation period).
2o5. AOL's example suggests that the imposition of Rule lob-5 liability on the corporation can be
used to deter securities fraud when there are long-term shareholders. Cf. James C. Spindler,
Vicarious Liability for Bad Corporate Governance: Are We Wrong About iob-5?, 13 AM. L. &
ECON. REV. 359 (2011) (presenting a model in which Rule lob- 5 improves corporate govern-
ance by forcing long-term shareholders to bear part of the cost of misreporting in the short
term).
2o6. See, e.g., Natalie Mizik & Robert Jacobson, Earnings Inflation Through Accruals and Real Ac-
tivity Manipulation: Its Prevalence at the Time of an SEO and the Financial Market Consequences
(June 4, 2007) (working paper), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1031oo6 [http://perma
.cc/MK6Q-2JUF] (finding that firms conducting SEOs engage in real-earnings manage-
ment, leading to temporary overvaluation of the firm by the market).
207. See, e.g., Siew Hong Teoh et al., Earnings Management and the Underperformance of Seasoned
Equity Offerings, 50 J. FIN. ECON. 63, 64-65 (1998) (reporting that seasoned equity issuers
raise pre-issuance reported earnings by altering discretionary accruals, and that this ma-
nipulation lowers post-offering returns).
208. See Daniel A. Cohen & Paul Zarowin, Accrual-Based and Real Earnings Management Activities
Around Seasoned Equity Offerings, 50 J. ACCT. & ECON. 2, 11 (2010) (finding use of both ac-
crual-based and real earnings management in a sample of 1511 SEOs between 1987 and
2006); see also S.P. Kothari et al., Managing for the Moment: The Role of Real Activity Versus
Accruals Earnings Management in SEO Valuation 26-27 (working paper, 2012) (finding, in a
sample of pre-Sarbanes Oxley SEOs, that real earnings management is likely to be a bigger
driver of overvaluation than earnings manipulation).
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prising that firms with large shareholders (which tend to be long-term share-
holders) are more likely to engage in earnings manipulation around equity of-
ferings than firms without such blockholders. For example, one recent exami-
nation of 1372 firm-commitment SEOs found that firms' accruals increase
around the SEOs when there are large outside shareholders that own more
than 5% of the firm's stock, but found that there is no increase in the absence of
such shareholders. 9 This study suggests that costly price-boosting manipula-
tion around equity issuances may, in fact, be designed to serve the interests of
long-term shareholders.
VIII. WHEN IS FAVORING LONG-TERM SHAREHOLDERS
UNDESIRABLE?
Parts IV through VII have demonstrated that, when a firm buys or sells its
own shares, managers seeking to boost long-term shareholder returns may well
take steps that destroy economic value. Neither short-term shareholder inter-
ests nor long-term shareholder interests align fully with pie maximization. Ra-
ther, each type of shareholder will want managers to maximize the payout to
her own group, even if those steps may reduce the size of the pie -the value
flowing to all shareholders - short-term, long-term, and future - over time.
One cannot be confident, a priori, that long-term shareholder interests are
necessarily better- or worse-aligned with pie maximization than are short-term
shareholder interests. Short-term shareholders benefit from costly price-
boosting manipulation. Long-term shareholders benefit from costly contrac-
tion, costly expansion, and costly price manipulation (price-boosting around
equity issuances, price-depressing around repurchases). Each type of share-
holder, therefore, is characterized by its own set of "vices."' "
209. See Katherine Guthrie & Jan Sokolowsky, Large Shareholders and the Pressure To Manage
Earnings, 16 J. CoRP. FIN. 302, 318 (2oo).
210. In considering the "vices" of each type of shareholder, it is important to know whether
short-term shareholders might independently benefit from the various types of value-
reducing actions that I have identified as benefitting long-term shareholders. If so, the cost
of favoring long-term shareholders over short-term shareholders would be lower.
We have seen, however, that the value-destroying actions benefitting long-term share-
holders are likely to have mixed effects on short-term shareholders. Costly contraction re-
purchases may slightly benefit short-term shareholders by pushing up the short-term stock
price. Costly expansion issuances, on the other hand, are likely to hurt short-term share-
holders by lowering the short-term stock price. Costly price manipulation will benefit or
hurt short-term shareholders, depending on whether the price is being manipulated up or
down. Because it seems unlikely that short-term shareholders will systematically benefit
from the types of value-destroying actions that benefit long-term shareholders, I will as-
sume here that they do not.
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While it is difficult to make sweeping statements about whose interests are
better aligned with all the firm's shareholders over time, it is possible to identi-
fy factors that will tend to make long-term shareholders worse representatives
than short-term shareholders, at least in the shareholder-only firm (in which
shareholders are the only residual claimants) that I have been considering so
far.
A. Volume of Repurchases and Equity Issuances
As we saw in Part III, managers serving long-term shareholder interests in
a non-transacting firm will seek to maximize the pie. However, as we saw in
Parts IV through VII, share repurchases and equity transactions decouple the
interests of long-term shareholders from pie maximization and may well en-
courage managers serving long-term shareholders to destroy value (that is, to
pursue long-term shareholder interests at the expense of the pie).
In the U.S., publicly traded firms buy and sell approximately $1 trillion of
their own shares each year.2" A typical U.S. firm buys and sells 30% of its mar-
ket capitalization over a five-year period. 2 Obviously, some firms buy and sell
more than 30%; others, less. The higher the volume of repurchases and equity
issuances, the more likely it is that long-term shareholder interests will be less
aligned with pie-maximization than are short-term shareholder interests.
By contrast, the lower the volume of repurchases and equity issuances, the
more likely it is that long-term shareholder interests will be better (that is,
more closely aligned with pie maximization) than short-term shareholder in-
terests. Consider, for example, a firm that rarely transacts in its own shares -
that is, an (essentially) non-transacting firm. In such a firm, long-term share-
holder interests will almost inevitably be better aligned with pie maximization
than short-term shareholder interests. This raises two policy-related questions
explored below: (1) Can rarely transacting firms be identified in advance? (2)
Should firms be prohibited from transacting in their own shares?
211. See supra Parts IV.A (providing evidence that share repurchases typically exceed $500 billion
per year), VI.A (providing evidence suggesting that equity issuances are of the same magni-
tude as share repurchases).
z12. See supra Parts IV.A (providing evidence that share repurchases over five years amount to
15% of total stock market capitalization), VI.A (providing evidence suggesting that equity is-
suances are of the same magnitude as share repurchases).
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1. Can Rarely Transacting Firms Be Identified Ex Ante?
Is it possible to identify firms today that, in the future, will only rarely
transact in their own shares? One might think that long-term shareholders in
firms that have rarely transacted in their own shares in the past are more likely
to be better representatives of shareholder interests going forward. Unfortu-
nately, however, it is difficult to know whether a firm that has rarely transacted
in the past will continue to rarely transact in the future. To begin, the degree to
which a firm has transacted in its own shares in the past can be expected to de-
pend, in part, on the historic divergence between share price and share value:
the smaller the historic divergence, the less likely the firm will have transacted
in its own shares. But the fact that the stock price did not historically diverge
much from share value does not necessarily mean there will be little divergence
in the future.
Second, the degree to which a firm has until now transacted in its own
shares may depend on long-term shareholders' historic influence on manage-
ment. If long-term shareholder influence has been weak, then the firm may not
have fully exploited divergences between the share price and share value to buy
stock at a cheap price and sell stock at an expensive price. But if long-term
shareholders gain more power in that firm, we can expect that firm to transact
more in the future than it has in the past, everything else remaining equal. So
shifting power to long-term shareholders in rarely transacting firms may well
turn these firms into frequently transacting firms.
In short, we can confidently conclude that, in a rarely transacting firm,
managers serving long-term shareholder interests are likely to generate more
value than managers serving short-term shareholder interests. But since the
magnitude of market mispricing and the degree of long-term shareholder in-
fluence may change in a firm over time, we have little idea as to which firms
will rarely transact in the future.
2. Should Firms Be Prohibited from Transacting in Their Own Shares?
When presenting this work, I have often been asked whether firms should
simply be prohibited from transacting in their own shares. Such a prohibition
would eliminate all of the distortions I have identified in this Article. It would
also tie long-term shareholders' payoffs to the value flowing to all of the firm's
1617
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shareholders over time. This, in turn, would substantially strengthen the case
for favoring long-term shareholders. 3
In my view, from the perspective of society as a whole, there is likely to be
substantial benefit to sharply limiting, if not eliminating, public firms' ability
to repurchase their own shares. As I have explained elsewhere, the marginal so-
cial benefit of enabling a firm to engage in share repurchases, given its ability
to distribute cash through a regular dividend or a special dividend, is fairly lim-
ited.214 On the other hand, the social costs of repurchases, which go beyond
those described in this Article, are likely to be considerable."
Equity issuances, however, are indispensable. While a firm with excess cash
that cannot repurchase its own shares can always distribute the excess cash
through a dividend, there is no alternative to an equity issuance for a firm that
needs additional equity capital. So even if repurchases were prohibited, which
is unlikely to happen any time soon, firms would (and should) still be permit-
ted to issue shares. In short, we are likely always to have transacting firms and,
therefore, a disconnect between long-term shareholder returns and the size of
the pie.
B. Managers'Ability To Exploit Information Asymmetry via the Firm
The desirability of having managers pursue long-term shareholder interests
will depend, in part, on managers' ability to buy shares at a cheap price and sell
shares at an inflated price. This ability, in turn, will depend on the degree of
mispricing in markets, the efficiency of markets in absorbing information
213. However, as I will explain in the next Part, other considerations, such as the need to control
managerial agency costs, may still make it undesirable to tilt the balance of power from
short-term shareholders to long-term shareholders.
214. See Fried, supra note 121, at 1336-40 (describing share repurchases' benefits for shareholders
and explaining why they are either trivial or represent wealth transfers from other parties).
215. In this Article, I have described two social costs associated with the use of share repurchases
to further the interests of long-term shareholders: (1) they can cause managers to distribute
too much cash when the stock is underpriced, and (2) they can cause managers to waste val-
ue by manipulating the stock price downwards. In addition, there are social costs associated
with the use of repurchases to further the interests of short-term shareholders and manag-
ers. First, managers seeking to unload some of their own shares or serve short-term share-
holders may use share repurchases to mechanically boost the short-term stock price through
a price pressure effect, even if the cash used could generate more economic value inside the
firm. Second, managers may use share repurchases to manipulate earnings per share (EPS)
and boost their EPS-based bonuses, even if the cash could generate more social value if left
inside the firm. See, e.g., Heitor Almeida et al., The Real Effects of Share Repurchases 7 (Univ.
of Ill. at Urbana-Champaign, working paper, 2014) (finding "suggestive evidence" that
"firms are willing to sacrifice valuable investments to finance share repurchases" designed to
boost EPS).
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about repurchases and equity issuances, and the degree to which managers can
hide from investors information about the firm's ongoing share repurchases
and equity issuances. The greater the degree of mispricing and inefficiency,
and the looser the disclosure regulations for repurchases and equity issuances,
the more likely it is that managers serving long-term shareholders will destroy
more value than managers serving short-term shareholders.
For example, and as discussed earlier, U.S. firms can purchase shares se-
cretly through open market repurchases (OMRs) and sell shares secretly
through at-the-market offerings (ATMs); this enables firms more easily to ex-
ploit differences between the share price and share value. Elsewhere, I have ar-
gued that firms trading in their own shares should be subject to the same dis-
closure requirements that apply to the firms' insiders trading in those same
shares. 6 Imposing such disclosure requirements would make it more difficult
for managers to use inside information in share repurchases and equity issu-
ances, and it would therefore better align long-term shareholder interests with
the creation of economic value.
In short, managers serving long-term shareholders are more likely to de-
stroy value if, for any given volume of repurchases and equity issuances, man-
agers can easily exploit informational asymmetry when having the firm buy
and sell its own shares.
C. The Difficulty ofEngaging in Costly Price Manipulation
Both short-term shareholders and long-term shareholders can benefit from
costly price manipulation. But the costly price manipulation that benefits long-
term shareholders is likely to destroy considerably less value than the costly
price-boosting manipulation that benefits short-term shareholders.
First, costly price manipulation can benefit long-term shareholders only if
the firm is repurchasing or issuing shares. By contrast, costly price-boosting
manipulation can benefit short-term shareholders whether or not the firm is
transacting in its own shares. Because firms may not constantly repurchase or
issue shares, at any given time managers serving long-term shareholders are
less likely to engage in price-boosting manipulation than managers serving
short-term shareholders.
Second, because they have continuing interests in the firm, long-term
shareholders are hurt ex post by costly price manipulation that destroys too
much economic value; by contrast, short-term shareholders are not. Conse-
quently, when managers engage in costly price manipulation for long-term
16. Fried, Insider Trading, supra note 21, at 834-35 (proposing that firms, like their insiders, be
required to disclose trades within two business days).
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shareholders, it is likely to be less destructive than when managers engage in
costly price manipulation for short-term shareholders.
Therefore, everything else being equal, the harder it is for managers to en-
gage in costly price manipulation, the more likely it is that short-term share-
holder interests will be better (more closely aligned with pie maximization)
than long-term shareholder interests. For example, consider a world in which
costly price manipulation is impossible, but in which long-term shareholders
can benefit from costly contraction and costly expansion. In such a world,
long-term shareholder interests will be less aligned with pie maximization than
short-term shareholder interests.
IX. FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS IN ASSESSING THE DESIRABILITY
OF FAVORING LONG-TERM SHAREHOLDERS
My purpose has been to show that managers serving long-term shareholder
interests, like managers serving short-term shareholder interests, may act in
ways that destroy economic value. Managers serving long-term shareholders
may not generate more value over time than managers serving short-term
shareholders. Indeed, they may well generate less. Proposals to increase the
number and power of long-term shareholders could thus lead to a smaller pie,
not a larger one.
My analysis has focused on a highly stylized setting with two important
simplifications. First, I have focused on a shareholder-only firm, where share-
holders are the only residual claimants on the value generated by the firm. In
other words, I have ignored other stakeholders. Second, I have assumed that
managers seek to advance the interests of either short-term or long-term
shareholders rather than to benefit themselves at shareholders' expense; in
other words, I have abstracted from managerial agency costs. In most firms,
however, there are likely non-shareholder residual claimants and, more im-
portantly, managerial agency costs. Ultimately, the desirability of favoring
long-term shareholders will depend, at least in part, on the effects of increasing
the relative power of long-term shareholders on non-shareholder residual
claimants and managerial agency costs.
In this Part, I briefly touch on these two issues. Part IX.A discusses the de-
gree to which favoring long-term shareholders is likely to benefit or hurt non-
shareholder residual claimants. Part IX.B addresses the degree to which favor-
ing long-term shareholders is likely to increase or decrease managerial agency
costs. In both of these discussions, I implicitly assume that the corporation is a
simple non-transacting firm; accordingly, the financial interests of long-term
shareholders are more closely aligned with shareholder pie maximization than
with the interests of short-term shareholders. My goal here is not to provide a
complete analysis of these issues. Rather, it is to explain why it is far from clear
1620
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that considerations of stakeholders and managerial agency costs strengthen the
case for favoring long-term shareholders.
A. Non-Shareholders as Residual Claimants
My analysis so far has considered a firm in which the only residual claim-
ants on the value generated by the firm are its current and future shareholders.
However, while shareholders might be the most important residual claimants
on the economic pie created by the firm, they are clearly not the only residual
claimants. Other parties, such as employees and creditors, may also be affected
by managers' decision making. Indeed, the existence of such non-shareholder
residual claimants has led prominent legal academics such as Margaret Blair
and Lynn Stout to argue for a "stakeholder approach" to corporate governance:
corporations should be run for the benefit of all stakeholders with residual
claims on the corporation, not just shareholders. " 7
How would the presence of non-shareholder residual claimants affect the
desirability of favoring long-term shareholders? It is believed that managers
serving short-term shareholders will take steps that harm other stakeholders to
boost the short-term stock price. ' On the other hand, it is claimed that man-
agers seeking to benefit long-term shareholders will (or should) directly serve
these constituencies as a means to that end.1 9 The idea that stakeholders are
better off if managers seek to serve long-term shareholders rather than short-
term shareholders is intuitively appealing.
However, intuition can lead one astray. Neither short-term nor long-term
shareholder interests can be counted on to align with the interests of non-
shareholder parties. For example, managers serving either short-term share-
217. See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 32, at 250-51 (1999) (explaining that non-shareholder con-
stituencies are also residual claimants on the corporate pie).
218. See, e.g., MAYER, supra note 18, at 185-86 (short-term shareholders press managers to take
steps that harm non-shareholder stakeholders).
219. See, e.g., Lisa M. Fairfax, The Rhetoric of Corporate Law: The Impact of Stakeholder Rhetoric on
Corporate Norms, 31 J. CoPP. L. 675, 702 (2006) (stating that "proponents of the long-term
view of shareholder primacy would contend that such a view accommodates non-
shareholder issues ... because 'stakeholder' concerns, such as giving money to charity or
behaving responsibly towards employees and customers, inure to the benefit of shareholders
in the long-term"); Virginia Harper Ho, "Enlightened Shareholder Value": Corporate Govern-
ance Beyond the Shareholder-Stakeholder Divide, 36 J. CoRP. L. 59, 62 (2010) (advocating the
view that attention to stakeholder interests is a means to generate long-term shareholder
wealth).
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holders or long-term shareholders may have an incentive to transfer value to
shareholders and away from long-term stakeholders or creditors.' °
Indeed, one of the very problems associated with "short-termism" may lead
managers serving long-term shareholders to squeeze more value from these
non-shareholder stakeholders than managers serving short-term shareholders.
Critics of short-termism typically argue that the stock market cannot properly
value investments with a long-term payoff."' The market sees only the short-
term costs associated with these investments, not the long-term benefits. As a
result, managers serving short-term shareholders will not undertake such in-
vestments.
But if the stock market does not properly value investments with a long-
term payoff, it is unlikely to properly reflect the present value of future savings
from cost-minimizing or cost-reducing steps at the expense of non-shareholder
residual claimants. Thus, short-term shareholders may well derive less benefit
than long-term shareholders from "investing" in strategies that shift value
from non-shareholder constituencies to shareholders over time.
Suppose, for example, that in XYZ Corporation the only residual claimants
on the value generated by the firm are shareholders and employees. A union is
seeking to organize XYZ employees. If the union succeeds, wages will rise. The
present value of the extra wages, which represents a transfer from shareholders
to employees, is $500 million. XYZ's managers can thwart the union and pre-
vent a wage increase by inefficiently idling a factory for a month, reducing cur-
rent earnings by $300 million. Assume that, from an economic perspective,
idling the factory is undesirable: it destroys $300 million of value. Assume fur-
ther that all of this information is public. However, the market has difficulty
properly valuing the extra cash that will flow to shareholders over time if wages
do not increase.
If managers serve long-term shareholders, then they will idle the factory
because the move will save long-term shareholders $200 million ($500 million
less $300 million). But if managers serve short-term shareholders, they may
not shut down the factory. To the extent the market impounds the $300 mil-
lion short-term loss, but has difficulty impounding the $500 million long-term
gain, such a move could lower the short-term stock price, thereby hurting
short-term shareholders. If managers serving short-term shareholders believe
that idling the factory will depress the short-term stock price, then they may
refrain from doing so.
220. See Roe, supra note 104, at 1004 (noting that corporate "[b]ad behavior could be long-term
or short-term").
221. See Bratton &Wachter, supra note 7, at 661, 700.
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Wal-Mart may well provide an instructive illustration. The firm is well
known for keeping employee wages extremely low, even as compared to other
large discount retailers.' Indeed, some analysts have suggested that its work-
ers are so poorly paid that they are forced to make much greater use of public
health and welfare programs than the employees of similar firms, 3 costing
taxpayers upwards of $3000 per employee annually in public benefit pro-
grams.' 4 These low wages are reportedly maintained via aggressive anti-union
tactics." These tactics are employed not to benefit short-term shareholders,
but rather to serve the interests of the long-term shareholders who control the
firm: members of the Walton family.'
6
I don't bring up Wal-Mart to criticize or defend the firm's labor practices.
Rather, I use the Wal-Mart example to illustrate the simple point that manag-
ers serving long-term shareholders cannot automatically be expected to treat
non-shareholder constituencies better than managers serving short-term
shareholders. To the extent that markets are not efficient, they might treat
them even worse.
222. According to Ken Jacobs et al., "Controlling for differences in geographic location, Wal-
Mart workers in the United States earn an estimated 12.4 percent less than retail workers as
a whole, and 14.5 percent less than workers in large retail in general." Ken Jacobs et al., Liv-
ing Wage Policies and Big-Box Retail: How a Higher Wage Standard Would Impact Walmart
Workers and Shoppers, UNIV. CAL., BERKELEY CENTER FOR LAB. RESEARCH & EDUC. 1-2
(2011), http://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/pdf/2oll/bigboxjlivingwage-policieslx.pdf [http://
perma.cc/AR3P-LRED].
223. See Arindrajit Dube et al., Firm Entry and Wages: Impact of Wal-Mart Growth on Earnings
Throughout the Retail Sector, UNIV. OF CAL., BERKELEY INST. FOR RESEARCH ON LAB. & EMP'T
36-37 (2007), http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/z2s5k4pv.pdf [http://perma.cc /K2MX-
X8RA].
224. See DEMOCRATIC STAFF OF H. COMM. ON EDUC. AND THE WORKFORCE, THE LOW-WAGE
DRAG ON OUR ECONOMY: WAL-MART'S Low WAGES AND THEIR EFFECT ON TAXPAYERS
AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 10 (2013), http://democrats.edworkforce.house.gov/sites
/democrats.edworkforce.house.gov/files/documents/WalMartReport-May2ol3.pdf [http://
perma.cc/AQM4-VLJG].
225. These tactics include sending managers to eavesdrop on employees, warning employees that
they will lose benefits if they organize, and even firing workers for their union activity. See
Discounting Rights: Wal-Mart's Violation of US Workers' Right to Freedom of Association, HUM.
RTS. WATCH (May 1, 2007), http://www.hrw.org/reports/2oo7/o4/3o/discounting-rights-o
[http://perma.cc/P34S-HU2W]; see also Gary Gereffi & Michelle Christian, The Impacts of
Wal-Mart: The Rise and Consequences of the World's Dominant Retailer, 25 ANN. REV. SOC. 573,
581-82 (2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1523785 [http://perma.cc/FG3W-AQP3].
226. Renee Dudley, Wal-Mart Board Seen at Risk of Losing Independent Voices, BLOOMBERG,
June 6, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2o13-o6-o6/wal-mart-board-seen-at-risk
-of-losing-independent-voices.html [http://perma.cc/QJ49-MGWC] (reporting that Wal-
Mart is considered a controlled corporation because of the Walton family's ownership of
more than So% of Wal-Mart's equity).
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Of course, even if managers serving long-term shareholders do treat non-
shareholder residual claimants better than managers serving short-term share-
holders, the question remains as to whether managers loyally serving long-
term shareholders will generate a bigger economic pie than managers loyally
serving short-term shareholders. Even if long-term shareholder interests are
more closely aligned with those of non-shareholder constituencies, they could
still be less aligned with overall pie maximization than are short-term share-
holder interests.
B. Managerial Agency Costs
My analysis has considered a firm in which managers loyally serve either
short-term shareholders or long-term shareholders. In the real world, there are
managerial agency costs: managers will tend to act in ways that benefit them-
selves at the expense of shareholders. 7 Indeed, shareholders' ability to mini-
mize managerial agency costs is one of the most important challenges in the
corporate governance of widely held firms. Therefore, the desirability of steps
to favor long-term shareholders will depend in large part on how these steps
affect shareholders' ability to reduce managerial agency costs.
On the one hand, it is possible that managerial agency costs would be lower
if long-term shareholders had more power. If markets are not efficient, then
the benefit of reducing managerial agency costs may not be fully reflected in
the short-term stock price. In such a scenario, long-term shareholders may
have a greater interest in reducing managerial agency costs than short-term
shareholders because they hold their shares for a longer time., 8 Long-term
shareholders may find it easier to evaluate managerial performance because
they are more familiar with it. Moreover, managers may be more willing to
bend to the demands of long-term shareholders than the demands of short-
term shareholders, knowing that the long-term shareholders are there to stay.
On the other hand, favoring long-term shareholders at short-term share-
holders' expense could also increase managerial agency costs. Many long-term
shareholders might (everything else being equal) not be willing to hold as con-
centrated a position in the stock as short-term shareholders, reducing their in-
centive to monitor managers. There may also be certain types of shareholders,
such as activist hedge funds, that are particularly capable of monitoring and
227. See, e.g., Jensen & Meckling, supra note 35, at 308-09. For example, managers may entrench
themselves, engage in value-destroying manipulation to boost their compensation, build in-
efficient empires, or fail to downsize when appropriate-all of which shrink the pie.
228. See Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39
UCLA L. REV. 811, 863 (1992).
124:1554 2015
THE UNEASY CASE FOR FAVORING LONG-TERM SHAREHOLDERS
disciplining managers but cannot or will not commit to holding stock for the
very long term.' 9 Their ability to induce desirable change in firms will decline
as long-term shareholders acquire more power. Therefore, shifting power away
from short-term shareholders to long-term shareholders could lead to either
lower or higher managerial agency costs.
C. It's Still an Uneasy Case
In Part VIII, I described the factors affecting whether managers serving
long-term shareholders will generate more or less long-term economic value
than managers serving short-term shareholders - assuming a world where
shareholders are the only residual claimants and there are no managerial agen-
cy costs. In short, in this simple setting, it is far from clear that favoring long-
term shareholders will increase the size of the pie when the firm transacts in its
own shares. Indeed, favoring long-term shareholders may well decrease the
size of the pie in a transacting firm.
In this Part, I have briefly described two other considerations: (i) the pos-
sibility that non-shareholder "stakeholders" are also residual claimants on the
pie; and (2) managerial agency costs. We have seen that, in the context of any
firm (including a non-transacting firm), favoring long-term shareholders may
benefit or hurt non-shareholder stakeholders and may reduce or increase man-
agerial agency costs. Thus, when these two considerations are added to the
mix, the case for favoring long-term shareholders at any firm could become
weaker or stronger. In short, even after accounting for these two factors, the
case for favoring long-term shareholders is not compelling.
CONCLUSION
The power of short-term shareholders, it has been argued, leads to "short-
termism": managers feel pressured to boost the short-term stock price at the
expense of maximizing the size of the economic pie created by the firm over
time. To counter short-termism, academics and policymakers, as well as lead-
ing business executives and corporate lawyers, have proposed various reforms
t2g. See generally Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Cor-
porate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021 (2007) (describing the monitoring benefits generated
by the presence of short-term hedge funds); see also Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon,
The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance
Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REv. 863 (2013). For evidence that these short-term hedge funds bene-
fit long-term shareholders, see Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Long-Term Effects of Hedge
Fund Activism, 115 COLUM. L. REv. (forthcoming 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2291577
[http ://perma.cc/5BRZ-GHCB].
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aimed at increasing both the number and power of long-term shareholders rel-
ative to short-term shareholders. These proposals appear to reflect the strongly
held intuition that managers serving long-term shareholders are likely to gen-
erate more economic value over time than managers serving short-term share-
holders.
In this Article, I have shown that this intuition is flawed, at least for the
typical U.S. firm-one that heavily buys and sells its own shares. On average,
U.S. firms trade 30% of their own shares over a five-year period.230 In transact-
ing firms, managers can benefit long-term shareholders merely by transferring
wealth from other shareholders through bargain repurchases and inflated-price
issuances. Indeed, almost 20% of the wealth created for long-term shareholders
today is generated by managers using repurchases and equity issuances to
transfer wealth from other shareholders.231 In a transacting firm, long-term
shareholders, like short-term shareholders, can benefit from managers' delib-
erately destroying value. In particular, long-term shareholders can benefit
when managers underinvest in firm projects to buy back stock at a low price,
overinvest in projects to sell stock at a high price, manipulate the stock price
downward around the time of repurchases, and manipulate the stock price up-
ward around the time of equity issuances. There is evidence suggesting that
managers seeking to increase long-term shareholder value engage in these very
activities, 32 which may well destroy more value than short-termism. As a re-
sult, reforms that further favor long-term shareholders in the typical firm could
actually reduce the size of the pie created by the firm over time.
My analysis indicates that it is ultimately an empirical question as to which
shareholders - short-term or long-term - have interests that are better aligned
with a firm's creation of economic value over time. One of my purposes in
writing this Article is to encourage academics to take up this question.33 De-
termining whether managers serving long-term shareholders are likely to gen-
erate more value than managers serving short-term shareholders is crucial for
properly evaluating proposals for regulatory intervention, as well as new pri-
230. See Parts IV.A, VI.A.
231. See Sloan & You, supra note 30.
232. See supra Parts V.A.2, V.B, VII.A.2, VII.B.2.
233. One way to begin to answer the question of whether long-term shareholders or short-term
shareholders have interests that are more aligned with the creation of economic value over
time would be to investigate whether long-term shareholder returns, the standard metric
used for evaluating firm and managerial performance, accurately reflect the amount of value
flowing to all of the firm's shareholders over the relevant period (aggregate shareholder val-
ue). To the extent that long-term shareholder returns deviate substantially from aggregate
shareholder value, there is a higher likelihood that long-term shareholder interests are less
aligned with economic value generation than are short-term shareholder interests.
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vate ordering arrangements. It is not enough to assume, as many do, that it
will be desirable to strengthen the hand of long-term shareholders in public
companies simply because they hold their shares for a longer time than short-
term shareholders.
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